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Indefinite Detention and Antiterrorism
Laws: Balancing Security and Human
Rights
Dr. JoAnne M. Sweeny
I.

Introduction

In February 2013, over 100 of the 166 detainees at the United
States’ prison in Guantanamo Bay in Cuba staged a hunger strike to
protest their detentions.1 These hunger strikes led to a brief flurry of
media and political detention but have resulted in no substantive changes
to existing law or policy.2 Although the detainees at Guantanamo Bay
have received the most media attention, they are not the only “lifers”
being indefinitely detained under the PATRIOT Act. Thousands are
currently being held – because they are suspected terrorists or because
they cannot legally be deported – in prisons or immigration detention
facilities across the United States without any hope of release.3 The
United States is not the only country that responded to terrorist threats
with indefinite detention of suspects. In the aftermath of September 11,


Assistant Professor of Law, University of Louisville, Louis D. Brandeis School of Law.
PhD, Queen Mary, University of London. A previous version of this paper was presented
at the American Association of Law Schools Section on International Human Rights in
January 2013, at the Junior Scholar’s Virtual Colloquium in July 2013, and the Loyola
Constitutional Colloquium in November 2013. Many thanks to the commentators at
these conferences, particularly Professors Diane Marie Amann, Jessica Kiser and Kellen
Zale. Additional thanks to Francesca Laguardia, Philip Heleringer and Martin French for
their assistance with this article. Any remaining errors are solely the author’s.
1. Peter Finn, Number of Protesting Guantanamo Bay Detainees Being Force-fed
Grows to 41,WASH. POST, June 7, 2013, at A06, available at 2013 WLNR 13987748;
Amy Goodman, Guantanamo a Legal Morass, SPOKESMAN-REV. (Spokane, Wash.), Mar.
15, 2013, at 11A, available at 2013 WLNR 6580493.
2. Jared Del Rosso, What the Guantanamo Hunger Strikers Achieved, HUFFINGTON
POST, Aug. 8, 2013, available at 2013 WLNR 19583167; Peter Finn, Hearings Open for
9/11 Suspects, WASH. POST, June 18, 2013, at A03, available at 2013 WLNR 14852471;
Finn, supra note 1; Goodman, supra note 1.
3. It is unclear exactly how many people are being detained under the PATRIOT
Act. After the Department of Justice announced that it had detained 1147 persons seven
weeks after it began investigating the events of September 11, it has refused to provide
any updates to that total. Erwin Chemerinsky, Losing Liberties: Applying a Foreign
Intelligence Model to Domestic Law Enforcement, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1619, 1634 (2004).
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2001, the United Kingdom also enacted legislation to indefinitely detain
terrorism suspects who could not be legally deported.4
Indefinite detention of suspected terrorists presents a unique conflict
between the desire for security and preservation of constitutional or
human rights. Both the United States and United Kingdom have
struggled with how to balance these rights, and their respective
government branches have engaged in repeated conflicts to find the right
balance. The saga is still ongoing in both countries and represents a
powerful look into how governments create and modify laws that deal
with complicated political and moral issues. How these laws were made,
the inter-governmental conflicts they create, and the way these conflicts
are resolved – through compromise or “steamrolling” – provide unique
insights into the working of the government itself.
Therefore, this article does more than describe British and American
anti-terrorism laws; it shows how those laws go through conflicted
government branches and the bargains struck to create the anti-terrorism
laws that exist today. Instead of taking these laws as given, this Article
explains why they exist. More specifically, this article focuses on the
path anti-terrorism legislation followed in the United States and the
United Kingdom, with particular focus on each country’s ability (or lack
thereof) to indefinitely detain suspected non-citizen terrorists. Both
countries’ executives sought to have that power and both were limited by
the legislatures and courts but in different ways. These differences show
the human rights concerns both countries grappled with when enacting
anti-terrorism legislation and how the two governments approached
balancing those concerns.
These anti-terrorism laws also show which government branches
possessed the most power when creating the legislation, which branches
dictated the terms of these laws, and which branches were forced to
compromise. The different paths taken by the anti-terrorism legislation
in both countries also show the different styles of the two governments.
The branches of the United States government are more likely to openly
defy each other, knowing that checks and balances will ensure that no
branch dominates. In the United Kingdom, there is no strong tradition of
checks and balances so informal bargaining and consulting among the
branches is more common before legislation is proposed or amended.
The United Kingdom’s Human Rights Act has, however, begun to

4. See generally Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 21-35 (U.K.).
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change the culture and has caused more open opposition among the three
branches.
II.

Creating Antiterrorism Laws

The events of September 11, 2001 changed the way the world
looked at terrorism.5 Although many nations experienced terrorist
attacks within their borders prior to 2001, many legislators argued that
modern terrorists are fundamentally different and require a different legal
response.6 Both the United States and United Kingdom responded to the
terrorist attacks on September 11 with harsh anti-terrorism measures that
included the ability to effectively indefinitely detain suspected terrorists
without trial. However, the journeys these countries took to reach this
result were remarkably different. The United States PATRIOT Act and
the United Kingdom’s Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act (“AntiTerrorism Act”) both contain provisions for potentially indefinite
detention of suspected terrorists and, as shown below, the provisions
have met with different levels of resistance by the courts and the
legislature. The different journeys these laws took therefore give unique
insight into the way these two countries’ government branches make law.
A. The United States
The United States’ anti-terrorism policies were fundamentally
altered by the attacks on September 11, 2001. Although the United
States did have anti-terrorism policies in place before 2001, those laws
were much less substantive and were primarily used to punish those who
committed terrorist acts rather than trying to prevent terrorism.7
5. Sarah Collerton, Ten Years of Anti-terror Laws, ABC NEWS, Sept. 12, 2011,
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-09-12/ten-years-of-anti-terror-laws/2881034; Martha
Mendoza, Nations Turned to Anti-terrorism Laws as Shield — and Sword — After 9/11,
SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 3, 2011, http://seattletimes.com/text/2016104402.html (“[s]ince
9/11, almost every country has passed or revised anti-terrorism laws, from tiny Tonga to
giant China.”).
6. Edel Hughes, Entrenched Emergencies and the “War on Terror”: Time to
Reform the Derogation Procedure in International Law?, 20 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 1, 1
(2007); see also Monica Hakimi, International Standards for Detaining Terrorism
Suspects: Moving Beyond the Armed Conflict-Criminal Divide, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L
L. 593, 594 (2009) (describing how transnational jihadist groups do not operate on a
traditional battlefield).
7. Andrew Peterson, Addressing Tomorrow’s Terrorists, 2 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. &
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1. Anti-terrorism Laws and Indefinite Detention Prior to
September 11, 2001
One of the earliest uses of the term “terrorism” was an effort to
exclude immigrants who engaged in terrorist activity.8 Until the 1993
World Trade Center bombings, the United States did not have any
substantive criminal laws generally addressing domestic terrorism and
instead focused on using immigration laws to keep suspected terrorists
out of the United States.9 After the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995,
there was an even greater push to implement anti-terrorism laws aimed at
domestic terrorism.10 The first of these statutes was the Anti-Terrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).11 Passed on the one-year
anniversary of the Oklahoma City bombing, the AEDPA’s stated main
purpose was to help prevent terrorist attacks by “streamlining” death
penalty and habeas corpus proceedings.12 More specifically, the AEDPA
allowed states under some circumstances to “fast-track” death penalty
proceedings, and forced federal courts to give more deference to state
court decisions in habeas corpus proceedings.13 In addition to removing
procedural hurdles, the AEDPA also included a broad definition of what
criminal behavior constituted “terrorism” and increased punishments for
engaging in terrorist activity.14 During this time, those who committed
terrorist attacks against United States targets on foreign soil were often
given fewer constitutional protections, even if they were being
interrogated by American agents.15
POL’Y 297, 301 (2008).
8. Id. at 306, 311.
9. Id. at 316, 318.
10. Id. at 319; Jacqueline Ann Carberry, Note, Terrorism: A Global Phenomenon
Mandating a Unified International Response, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 685, 688-89
(1999); Patrick J. McDonnell, Sentenced to a Life in Limbo, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1998, at
A1, available at 1998 WLNR 6365905.
11. Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214.
12. Charles V. Zehren, Clearing the Hurdle: House Sends Anti-terrorism Bill to
Clinton, NEWSDAY, Apr. 19, 1996 at A20, available at 1996 WLNR 550302.
13. John H. Blume, AEDPA: The "Hype" and the "Bite", 91 CORNELL L. REV. 259,
259-60 (2006).
14. Peterson, supra note 7, at 320.
15. See, e.g., United States v. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d 168, 196-97 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (holding that detained suspects who were not notified of their right to notify their

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/6

4

1194

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:3

The AEDPA also mandated that all lawfully-admitted convicted,
aggravated felons be deported or, if they could not be deported, held
indefinitely.16 Aliens are usually detained indefinitely after a deportation
order for two reasons: the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
“is unable to carry out the deportation because the alien’s country of
origin refuses to readmit her . . . or the alien is generally considered
ineligible for release because she is too dangerous to release or is likely
to flee and frustrate deportation.”17
The INS’s ability to indefinitely detain aliens who cannot be
deported was further codified in the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), also passed in 1996.18 The
IIRIRA’s main focus was immigration: it reinforced the U.S. Border
Patrol, cracked down on the employment and smuggling of illegal aliens,
and imposed new restrictions on the ability of legal immigrants to obtain
government benefits.19 Section 241.4 of the IIRIRA states that criminal
aliens that have been ordered removed may be detained beyond the
removal period if the alien demonstrates a serious risk of non-compliance
with the removal order.20 Under subsequent regulations, reviews of nonremovable criminal aliens were to be held at least once a year.21 After
enactment, the AEDPA and IIRIRA were criticized for being unduly
harsh towards immigrants22 and the wrongly convicted.23

consulates of their detentions—which violated the Vienna Convention—had no judicial,
only a political, remedy for this violation).
16. Stacy J. Borisov, Give Me Liberty or Give Me Deportation: The Indefinite
Detention of Non-Removable, Criminal Aliens, 13 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 183, 191-92
(2001). Under the AEDPA, the INS no longer has discretion to admit these aliens even if
the INS determines that they are not a danger to society. Id.
17. Alexandra E. Chopin, Disappearing Due Process: The Case for Indefinitely
Detained Permanent Residents' Retention of Their Constitutional Entitlement Following
a Deportation Order, 49 EMORY L.J. 1261, 1274 (2000).
18. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546.
19. Senate Votes, 97-3, to Tighten Borders: Bill also Limits Benefits for Legal
Immigrants, WASH. POST, May 3, 1996, at A01, available at 1996 WLNR 6473307.
20. Megan Peitzke, The Fate of "Unremovable" Aliens Before and After September
11, 2001: The Supreme Court's Presumptive Six-Month Limit to Post-Removal-Period
Detention, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 769, 776 (2003).
21. 8 C.F.R § 241.4(k)(2) (2011).
22. Mary A. Mitchell, Reforms Limit Immigrants' Legal Options, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
Jan. 19, 1997, at 13, available at 1997 WLNR 7145872.
23. Editorial, Basic Rights Are the Victims, BOSTON GLOBE, May 9, 1997 at A22,
available at 1997 WLNR 2355318.
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As a result of these laws, by 2001, the United States was
indefinitely detaining over 3,400 deportable aliens who had been rejected
by their home countries.24 Numerous habeas corpus petitions were
brought by these detained aliens, which resulted in a circuit split between
the Ninth and Fifth Circuits. In the Ninth Circuit, in Ma v. Reno,25 the
petitioner argued that the INS was violating his due process rights
because he was being indefinitely detained after being ordered removed
to Cambodia, which would not permit his return because Cambodia had
no repatriation agreement with United States. The Ninth Circuit granted
the petitioner’s habeas corpus petition and held that the INS may “detain
aliens only for a reasonable time beyond the statutory removal period.” 26
If there is “no reasonable likelihood that a foreign government will
accept the alien’s return in the reasonably foreseeable future . . . the alien
must be released subject to the supervisory authority provided in the
statute.” 27
The Fifth Circuit took a different view.
In Zadvydas v.
28
Underdown, a resident alien was being indefinitely held because he was
“stateless” and had no other country to which he could be deported. The
Fifth Circuit denied habeas corpus relief, reasoning that Zadvydas was
not being indefinitely detained because he could “be released when it is
determined that he is no longer either a threat to the community or a
flight risk.”29 The Fifth Circuit also noted that Zadvydas’s detention was
reviewed every six months at which time he could present evidence that
supported his release. 30 Finally, the Fifth Circuit held that, although
finding a country to which the petitioner could be deported would be
“difficult at best,” the Fifth Circuit thought that more time should be
given to the INS before deciding that such deportation would be

24. Carberry, supra note 10, at 688-89; Michelle Mittelstadt, INS to Begin
Releasing Long-Detained Immigrants, CONTRA COSTA TIMES (Walnut Creek, CA), July
20, 2001.
25. Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2000), vacated sub nom. Zadvydas v. Davis,
533 U.S. 678 (2001), opinion modified sub nom. Kim Ho Ma v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1095
(9th Cir. 2001).
26. Ma, 208 F.3d at 821-22.
27. Id.
28. Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 1999), vacated sub nom.
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), opinion withdrawn and superseded sub nom.
Zadvydas v. Davis, 285 F.3d 398 (5th Cir. 2002).
29. Zadvydas, 185 F.3d, at 291.
30. Id.
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impossible. 31
In 2001, the Supreme Court consolidated Ma and Zadvydas and
finally decided the issue.32 The Supreme Court’s primary concern was
whether the statute actually permitted indefinite detention of an alien,
because doing so would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.33 More specifically, the Court held that “government
detention violates that Clause unless the detention is ordered in a
criminal proceeding with adequate procedural protections or, in certain
special and narrow nonpunitive circumstances where a special
justification, such as harm-threatening mental illness, outweighs the
individual’s constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical
restraint.”34 The Court determined that the proceedings were civil and
nonpunitive in purpose and effect but also held that there was no
“sufficiently strong special justification . . . for indefinite civil
detention.” 35 The Government’s two stated goals, ensuring that the alien
appears at immigration proceedings and protecting the community, were
held to be insufficient for two reasons.36 First, once the alien cannot be
reasonably deported, the reason for detaining her no longer exists.37
Second, although the alien may still be a danger to the community no
matter how long she is detained, whatever “danger” the alien poses does
not rise to the level previously allowed by the Supreme Court,
particularly with the small amount of procedural safeguards included in
the statute.38
The Supreme Court also held that, under the statute, detention is
potentially permanent and the length of detention is not determined by
the alien’s danger to the community but by whether the alien can be
deported. The Court noted that “[t]he provision authorizing detention
does not apply narrowly to a small segment of particularly dangerous
individuals, say, suspected terrorists, but broadly to aliens ordered
removed for many and various reasons, including tourist visa
violations.”39 The procedural protections for the aliens were also
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
533 U.S. 678 (2001).
Id.
Id. at 690 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 691.
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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criticized because the alien bears the burden of proving he is not
dangerous and there is no significant judicial review of the administrative
proceedings. 40 To the Supreme Court, “[t]he Constitution demands
greater procedural protection even for property.” 41
Noting that the relevant statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), contained no
“clear indication of congressional intent to grant the Attorney General
the power to hold indefinitely in confinement an alien ordered removed,”
the Court held that § 1231 “contains an implicit ‘reasonable time’
limitation, the application of which is subject to federal-court review.”42
The Court then held that there should be a rebuttable presumption
that six months is a “reasonable time:”
for the sake of uniform administration in the federal
courts, we recognize that period. After this 6-month
period, once the alien provides good reason to believe
that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the
reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must
respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.
And for detention to remain reasonable, as the period of
prior postremoval confinement grows, what counts as
the “reasonably foreseeable future” conversely would
have to shrink.43
The end result, according to the Court, is that “once removal is no longer
reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by
statute.”44
In response to the Supreme Court’s holding in Zadvydas, the
Attorney General directed the INS to implement regulations “that set
forth a procedure for detained aliens to follow in presenting claims that
they should be released from detention because there is no significant
likelihood that they will be removed in the foreseeable future.”45 The
INS promulgated regulations that created a hearing procedure and
40. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
41. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
42. Id. at 682.
43. Id. at 701.
44. Id. at 699.
45. Attorney General Issues Interim Procedure for Post-Order Custody Review
after Zadvydas, July 30, 2001, 78 No. 29 Interpreter Releases 1228, 1228-29.
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delineated factors that would enable the INS to indefinitely detain
unremovable aliens.46 Under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13, Aliens that are released
are still under an order of supervision, which, among other things,
requires them to report to INS officers periodically.47 Under 8 C.F.R. §
241.14, the INS may continue to detain unremovable aliens if they 1)
have “a highly contagious disease that is a threat to public safety;” 2)
have been detained on account of “serious adverse foreign policy
consequences of release;” 3) have been “detained on account of security
or terrorism concerns;” or 4) are “determined to be specially dangerous”
due to a history of violence, mental condition, or other factors that
represent a danger to the public.48
There was mixed response to Zadvydas in the media. Supporters of
existing immigration legislation thought that the Supreme Court was
legislating by expanding the “rights of aliens” to be the same as
citizens.49 Others saw the Supreme Court decision as repudiating the
former level of deference it had given to the government on immigration
policies and emphasizing that Constitutional rights apply to all “persons”
in the United States, whether there illegally or legally.50 Favorable media
reports also emphasized that the decision gave resolution to “lifers” who
were being held indefinitely by the INS.51 However, years after
Zadvydas, criticisms still arise when the INS releases illegal aliens who
cannot be deported. 52
Unsurprisingly, several lawsuits were initiated after Zadvydas, some
of which resulted in the release of detained immigrants. For example, in
Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 322 F.3d 386, 405-06 (6th Cir. 2003), the
Sixth Circuit extended Zadvydas to inadmissible aliens, not just
removable ones. Due to this decision, two Mariel Cubans53 who had
46. 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.13-14 (2013).
47. Id. §§ 241.13, 241.5.
48. Id. § 241.14.
49. Charles Lane & Hanna Rosin, Court Limits Detention of Immigrants; Justices
Rule Convicts Can't Be Held Indefinitely, WASH. POST, June 29, 2001, at A01, available
at 2001 WLNR 13187510.
50. Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court: The Issue of Confinement; Supreme
Court Limits Detention In Cases of Deportable Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2001,
at A1, available at 2001 WLNR 3383917.
51. Lane & Rosin, supra note 49.
52. Rich Cholodofsky, Inability to Deport 'Undesirable' Illegals Frustrates U.S.,
TRIB. REV. (Greensburg, Pa.), Mar. 27, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 5951623.
53. “Mariel Cubans” refers to Cubans who mass immigrated to the United States on
a boatlift from Mariel Harbor in 1980. Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 322 F.3d 386, 390-391
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served prison time for criminal convictions were released from INS
custody because Cuba, the only country to which they could be deported,
refused to accept them.54
8 C.F.R. § 241.14 has led to further litigation, which resulted in
another Circuit split between the Fifth and Tenth Circuits. The Fifth
Circuit held that 8 C.F.R. § 241.14 could not authorize indefinite
detention for any aliens covered by its authorizing statute, 8 U.S.C. §
1231, because the Supreme Court had already held that indefinite
detention was not permitted under that statute.55 Conversely, the Tenth
Circuit has allowed indefinite detention under 8 C.F.R. § 241.14 because
the regulations limit indefinite detention to “special circumstances,” such
as mental illness, that show that the alien represents a specific danger to
the public.56 The Tenth Circuit also noted that “the burden of proof is
now on the agency to prove dangerousness, rather than on the alien to
show non-dangerousness. In order to continue detention beyond the
removal period because an alien poses a special danger to the public, the
government must first demonstrate that there is ‘reasonable cause to go
forward with a merits hearing.’” 57 According to the Tenth Circuit, the
narrow set of “special circumstances” and reversed burden of proof in 8
C.F.R. § 241.14 comported with the Supreme Court’s holding in
Zadvydas. 58
2. Post-September 11 – The PATRIOT Act
As shown above, prior to September 11, 2001, existing terrorism
laws were concerned with deporting aliens who had committed
aggravated crimes.59 Those concerns expanded after the attacks on the
World Trade Center and resulted in new anti-terrorism legislation that
impacts the detention of unremovable aliens. The PATRIOT Act was
proposed in direct response to the terrorist attacks on September 11,

(6th Cir. 2003).
54. Id. at 391-92; see also, e.g., Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir.
2006); Ly v. Hansen, 351 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 2003).
55. Tran v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d 478, 484 (5th Cir. 2008).
56. Hernandez-Carrera v. Carlson, 547 F.3d 1237, 1253-54 (10th Cir. 2008).
57. Id. (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(h) (2013)).
58. Hernandez-Carrera, 547 F.3d at 1253-54.
59. See, e.g., Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub.
L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996).
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2001.60 What became the PATRIOT Act was originally proposed by the
Bush administration and championed by Attorney General John Ashcroft
as necessary because of the “clear and present danger” of further terrorist
attacks.61 Ashcroft also warned that the United States faced a “serious
threat” of additional terrorism, particularly after it launched retaliatory
strikes.62
It is perhaps no wonder, then, that the PATRIOT Act was quickly
passed by Congress. “One of the swiftest-moving bills in federal history,
the law was proposed five days after the Sept. 11 terror attacks.”63
September 11 brought bipartisan cooperation that would have been
“inconceivable” before the attacks.64 Due to this cooperation, the
PATRIOT Act was passed on October 26, 2001, six weeks after
September 11.65 The PATRIOT Act was also passed with a sizeable
majority; one senator voted against it66 and sixty-six representatives (out
of 432) voted against it.67 September 11 was clearly on Congress’ mind
as they considered the bill; many members of Congress had recently
traveled to New York to view the devastation at the World Trade
Center.68 The speed with which the bill went through Congress caused
some members to complain that “they had no idea what they were voting
on, [and] were fearful that aspects of the . . . bill went too far—yet voted
for it anyway, lest there be a further terrorist attack and they be accused
of not having provided the government sufficient means to defend

60. Dana Milbank, House Bill Would Expand Federal Detention Powers, WASH.
POST, Oct. 2, 2001, at A01, available at 2001 WLNR 13155248.
61. Id.
62. Kevin Johnson, Ashcroft: New Terror Likely, USA TODAY, Oct. 1, 2001 at 01A,
available at 2001 WLNR 3769313.
63. J. M. Lawrence, War on Terrorism; Anti-terror Laws in Place; Feds Urgently
Implement Crackdown, BOSTON HERALD, October 27, 2001, available at 2001 WLNR
267021.
64. Zachary Coile & Elizabeth Fernandez, Bill to Fight Terrorism Takes Shape:
Extension of Police Powers Stops Short of Ashcroft’s Request, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 2, 2001,
at A1, available at 2001 WLNR 5723393.
65. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107–56, 115 Stat. 272.
66. UNITED STATES SENATE, U.S. SENATE ROLL CALL VOTES 107TH CONGRESS-1ST
SESSION,
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=1
07&session=1&vote=00313 (last visited Apr. 25, 2014).
67. UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FINAL VOTE RESULTS FOR ROLL
CALL 398, http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2001/roll398.xml (last visited Apr. 25, 2014).
68. Milbank, supra note 60.
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against it.”69
The Bush Administration hoped that the aftermath of September 11
would cause Congress to pass the legislation it wanted without much
debate.70 However, despite the Bush Administration’s pressure, Congress
did amend provisions of the bill.71 Members of Congress were
particularly wary of some of the powers that Ashcroft sought such as
wiretapping and indefinite detention of suspected terrorists.
Representative Robert L. Barr Jr., a conservative Republican from
Georgia, noted that “the department has sought many of these authorities
on numerous other occasions, has been unsuccessful in obtaining them,
and now seeks to take advantage of what is obviously an emergency
situation to obtain authorities that it has been unable to obtain previously.
. .”72 For example, the PATRIOT Act allows “enemy combatants” to be
held indefinitely, as long as some procedural safeguards (such as habeas
corpus) are provided to them. 73
The PATRIOT Act also allows the government to detain any
foreigners suspected of terrorist activity for up to seven days without
filing charges or giving them an opportunity to ask a judge to release
them.74 Civil libertarians complained about this provision, but some had
to admit that it was a lot better than the original version of the bill –
Attorney General John Ashcroft had sought indefinite detention of
immigrants without a hearing if they were suspected of involvement in
terrorist acts.75 Still, indefinite detention is possible under the PATRIOT
Act: the Attorney General has the power to detain both legal and illegal
immigrants until they are deported, as long as he or she has “reasonable

69. Stampeded in the House, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Oct. 16, 2001, available at
2001 WLNR 13691967.
70. Neil A. Lews & Robert Pear, Bill to Expand Wiretap Rules but House Scales
Back Other Requests for Expanded Powers, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Oct. 2, 2001, at A1,
available at 2001 WLNR 3442295.
71. John Lancaster & Walter Pincus, Proposed Anti-Terrorism Laws Draw Tough
Questions; Lawmakers Express Concerns to Ashcroft, Other Justice Officials About
Threat to Civil Liberties, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2001, at A05, available at 2001 WLNR
13162112.
72. Id.
73. David Cole, Out of the Shadows: Preventive Detention, Suspected Terrorists,
and War, 97 CAL. L. REV. 693, 702 (2009); Hope Metcalf & Judith Resnik, Gideon at
Guantanamo: Democratic and Despotic Detention, 122 YALE L.J. 2504, 2517 (2013).
74. Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 1629.
75. Coile & Fernandez, supra note 64; Milbank, supra note 60.
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grounds to believe” that they may be involved in terrorism.76
More specifically, § 412 of the PATRIOT Act requires the Attorney
General to “take into custody any alien who is certified” as a terrorist
suspect or “is engaged in any other activity that endangers the national
security of the United States.”77 If removal to another country is unlikely
to occur in the near future, this section allows the Attorney General to
detain the alien for up to six months, with renewable six-month terms.78
These six-month detentions can go on indefinitely.79 The PATRIOT Act
does allow for judicial review in the form of habeas corpus proceedings,
first to any district court having jurisdiction and then (via appeal) to the
D.C. Circuit, which is statutorily limited to using only D.C. Circuit or
U.S. Supreme Court cases as precedent.80
3. Media Response
The media harshly criticized the PATRIOT Act for the wide and
largely unreviewable powers it granted to the executive. According to
one newspaper, the PATRIOT Act “[p]ermits the attorney general to
incarcerate or detain foreigners based on mere suspicion.”81 Other media
sources noted that the Bush administration also originally wanted the
power to hold non-U.S. citizens suspected of engaging in terrorist
activities indefinitely without being formally charged, but members of
Congress forced the administration to make concessions.82 The
PATRIOT Act was also criticized for not providing sufficient judicial

76. Milbank, supra note 60.
77. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2012). However, the Attorney General must begin removal
proceedings within seven days of detention. Id. See also Tung Yin, The Impact of the 911 Attacks on National Security Law Casebooks, 19 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 157, 17172 (2006).
78. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
79. Id. The Attorney General must review the detention every six months to make
sure it satisfies the requirements of Section 1226(a). Tran v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d 478,
485 (5th Cir. 2008); Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069, 1079 (9th Cir. 2006).
80. 28 U.S.C. §2241, held unconstitutional by Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723
(2008).
81. Terror Bill: Fear Wins, Rights Lose, WISCONSIN STATE J., Oct. 28, 2001, at B2,
available at 2001 WLNR 8774605.
82. Kelly Wallace, Bush Signs Anti-Terrorism Bill Into Law, CNN, Oct. 26, 2001,
http://transcripts.cnn.com/transcrips/0110/26/se.01.html. As a compromise decision, the
PATRIOT Act allows prosecutors to hold these suspected terrorists for up to seven days
without filing charges against them, which concerned some media outlets. Id.
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review when federal agents “indefinitely detain hundreds of non-citizens
whether or not they are here legally.”83 Despite these criticisms, 2001
polls showed that fifty-eight percent of the population approved of the
way George W. Bush handled the terrorist attacks.84
4. The Supreme Court’s Influence on the PATRIOT Act
The Supreme Court’s influence on the PATRIOT Act began as it
was being drafted. It is evident that Congress looked at prior Supreme
Court precedent for indefinite detention of non-nationals when drafting §
1226a of the PATRIOT Act. The six-month time limit on detention of
non-nationals suspected of terrorism appears to have been taken directly
from the Supreme Court’s holding in Zadvydas v. Davis85 in order to
comply with Zadvydas’s holding that an alien who is held for more than
six months has presumptively had his or her due process violated.86
In fact, the Supreme Court noted Congress’ adoption of Zadvydas’s
six-month presumption in the PATRIOT Act in Clark v. Martinez.87
Clark v. Martinez, like the Sixth Circuit case of Rosales-Garcia v.
Holland, extended Zadvydas to inadmissible aliens instead of just
removable ones.88 In response to the Government’s argument “that the
security of our borders will be compromised if it must release into the
country inadmissible aliens who cannot be removed,” the Supreme Court
noted that Congress could amend § 1231 to allow for indefinite detention
under special circumstances, as it had with the PATRIOT Act. 89
Congress’ acquiescence to the Supreme Court’s six-month renewable
detention periods has led other courts to apply Zadvydas in other
situations. For example, courts have used the PATRIOT Act’s six-month
review period to grant habeas to other kinds of unremovable aliens90 who

83. Susan Goering, Anti-terrorism Act Imperils Liberties, BALT. SUN, Oct. 30, 2001,
at 15A, available at 2001 WLNR 1048504. The PATRIOT Act allows habeas corpus
petitions only for those who are indefinitely detained. 8 U.S.C. § 1226a(a)(1) (2012).
84. Jane Lampman, Muslim in America, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 10, 2002,
available at 2002 WLNR 1563069.
85. 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
86. Id. at 701.
87. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 386 n.8 (2005).
88. Id. at 378.
89. Id. at 386 & n.8.
90. One example involves an alien convicted of a crime of violence who was
unremovable because the two countries to which he could be deported refused to accept
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did not explicitly benefit from the PATRIOT Act’s procedural
safeguards.91
Congress’ acceptance of Zadvydas’s six-month detention limit is
also evident in its subsequent creation of 8 C.F.R. § 241.14, which
allows for continuing detention of aliens who meet specific criteria
(including being suspected of terrorism) if proper review and hearings
are conducted.92 These aliens are also entitled to petition for a writ of
habeas corpus.93 This regulation has not been reviewed by the Supreme
Court but has been upheld by the Eighth Circuit.94 However, no court
has determined whether § 1226a’s indefinitely renewable six-month
terms would violate Due Process. The Supreme Court noted in Zadvydas
that “[a] statute permitting indefinite detention of an alien would raise a
serious constitutional problem”95 but Zadvydas also explicitly did not
apply to aliens that pose national security risks.96 It is unclear what the
result of any litigation on this issue would be but, for now, the state of
the law appears to be stable.
The interplay between the three branches of government in the
United States shows that these branches are comfortable with the explicit
dialogue they traditionally share. The legislature resisted the executive’s
initial legislative proposal and amended it in several respects. The fact
that the media was also critical of the bill likely reinforced the
legislature’s resolve. In addition, the executive was willing to use
existing Supreme Court cases (Zadvydas in particular) to draft some of
the terms of the PATRIOT Act. In response, the Supreme Court has
noted that the PATRIOT Act followed its prior rulings and indicated that
Congress should follow the PATRIOT Act as a model when drafting
other legislation. The long-standing tradition of separation of powers
appears to be alive and well in these interactions. In contrast, as shown
him. Tran v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d 478, 480 (5th Cir. 2008).
91. Mukasey, 515 F.3d at 485 (“In particular, in the field of national security,
Congress enacted the Patriot Act which authorizes detention beyond the removal period
of any alien whose removal is not foreseeable for additional periods of up to six months if
the alien presents a national security threat. Thus, not only are the Government's concerns
properly directed to Congress, but importantly Congress has shown that it has the
authority and willingness to address these concerns.” (internal footnote and citation
omitted)).
92. 8 C.F.R. § 241.14 (2011).
93. Id.
94. Hernandez-Carrera v. Carlson, 547 F.3d 1237, 1255 (10th Cir. 2008).
95. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).
96. Id. at 696.
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below, the interactions of the government branches in the United
Kingdom are far from set.
B. The United Kingdom
In contrast to the dearth of inter-governmental conflict seen in the
United States, the path taken by the United Kingdom’s anti-terrorism
legislation after September 11, 2011 is much more complex and involves
several amendments in response to objections from Parliament, British
Courts and the European Court of Human Rights. The United
Kingdom’s government structure and familiarity with terrorism are major
causes of these differences. In contrast, the enactment of the United
Kingdom’s first codified bill of rights, the Human Rights Act, allowed
the government branches to come into conflict in a more direct,
“American” way that would not have been possible only two years
earlier.
In 2001, the Human Rights Act had only recently come into effect.
In addition to incorporating the rights contained in the European
Convention on Human Rights, the Human Rights Act gave new powers
to the judiciary and created a new parliamentary committee to review
legislation that impacted human rights. Because the Human Rights Act
is a fairly recent statute, the Anti-Terrorism Act is one of the few pieces
of legislation that was proposed and enacted before the Human Rights
Act was in place, was reviewed by the Joint Committee on Human
Rights while it was still going through Parliament, and was later declared
incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. The
Anti-Terrorism Act is therefore an excellent case study of how the three
British branches of government work together or against each other to
create and change laws.
1. Government Structure
Although the United States’ government structure partially comes
from its historical ties to the United Kingdom, the two countries’ current
government structures are remarkably different. Instead of co-equal
branches of government with a strong separation of powers and checks
and balances, the British government branches are more integrated with
no emphasis placed on having branches with equivalent powers or the
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ability to “check” each other.97 Instead, the British executive branch –
the Prime Minister and his or her cabinet98 – dominates Parliament by
introducing the majority of Bills for consideration by the legislature and
ensuring that its bills are passed its through strong party control over the
Commons. Unlike in the United States, British Members of the House of
Commons almost invariably vote along party lines which means that the
Prime Minister, who, by definition is the leader of the party with the
majority of seats in the House of Commons, is virtually guaranteed that
his or her legislation will pass.99
Moreover, domination of Parliament essentially means domination
of the judiciary because the judiciary usually defers to Parliament under
the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty.100 According to the doctrine
of parliamentary sovereignty, Parliament in the United Kingdom is
supreme and no other power can overrule it, including the judiciary. 101
Due to the importance of this doctrine, the British judiciary has
traditionally deferred to Parliament when reviewing statutes.102
Since the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998, the branches of
government in Britain have become more co-equal. In order to help
Parliament meet its obligations under the Human Rights Act, the Joint
Committee on Human Rights was created. The Joint Committee on
Human Rights has the power to question the executive on the terms of a
bill and even propose amendments to that bill that Parliament can use in
its debates.103 Over time, this committee has become more powerful and
97. MALCOLM WALLES, BRITISH AND AMERICAN SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT 78
(1988).
98. The Monarch is considered the symbolic head of the executive but he or she has
no real power to block the actions of the Prime Minister. WALLES, supra note 97, at 78.
99. WALLES, supra note 97, at 78; R. M. PUNNETT, BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND
POLITICS 189 (5th ed. 1987). The House of Lords does not have strong party affiliations
but it cannot block legislation, it can only delay it. David Williams, The Courts and
Legislation: Anglo-American Contrasts, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 323, 333 (2001).
100. PETER LEYLAND, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM: A CONTEXTUAL
ANALYSIS 147 (2012).
101. See generally A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE
CONSTITUTION (1885). For an electronic version of this literature, visit
http://www.constitution.org/cmt/avd/law_con.htm.
102. See, e.g., R v. A, [2001] UKHL 25 [58] (Lord Hope) (“[I]t is appropriate in
some circumstances for the judiciary to defer, on democratic grounds, to the considered
opinion of the elected body as to where the balance is to be struck between the rights of
the individual and the needs of society”).
103. Janet L. Hiebert, Parliament and the Human Rights Act: Can the JCHR Help
Facilitate a Culture of Rights?, 4 INT’L J. CONST. LAW 1, 18-19 (2006).
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its well-written reports have become a tool for members of Parliament
during debates,104 the judiciary105 and human rights advocates in the
United Kingdom.106 These groups use the Joint Committee on Human
Rights’ reports to put pressure on the executive to change its policies and
legislation.
In addition, the British judiciary has been less likely to defer to
Parliament after the enactment of the Human Rights Act. The primary
purpose of the Human Rights Act was to incorporate the rights contained
in the European Convention on Human Rights into British law so that
those rights may be enforceable by British courts. To fulfill this purpose,
the Human Rights Act also gives new powers to the British judiciary so
it may ensure that the rights of British citizens are protected. Under the
Human Rights Act, the British judiciary can now creatively interpret
statutes or issue a Declaration of Incompatibility if creatively interpreting
a statute would mean effectively rewriting it.107
Section 3 of the Human Rights Act empowers British courts to
interpret all legislation to be compatible with the European Convention
on Human Rights insofar as it is “possible” to do so.108 Interpretative
techniques such as narrowing the applicability of the statute, “reading it
down” so it applies more narrowly, or reading terms into a statute are
now available to the judiciary even when the statute being interpreted is
not ambiguous.109 This means that British judges can even alter the
statute’s wording if doing so would make the statute compatible with the
European Convention on Human Rights.110
104. Janet L. Hiebert, Interpreting a Bill of Rights: The Importance of Legislative
Rights Review, 35 BRITISH J. POL. SCI. 235, 251(2005).
105. See, e.g., R. (Animal Defenders Int’l) v. Sec’y of State for Culture, Media &
Sport, [2008] UKHL 15 [14-21] (Lord Bingham) (agreeing with the Joint Committee on
Human Rights that the Communications Act 2003’s ban on all political advertising was
incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights).
106. See, e.g., LIBERTY, LIBERTY’S EVIDENCE TO THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN
RIGHTS’ INQUIRY INTO THE GOVERNMENT’S JUSTICE AND SECURITY GREEN PAPER, Feb.
2012, available at http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/pdfs/policy12/liberty-sevidence-to-the-jchr-inquiry-into-the-government-s-justice-and-sec.pdf (last visited Apr.
24, 2014).
107. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, §§ 3 & 4 (U.K), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/42/data.pdf.
108. Id. § 3.
109. Alison L. Young, Judicial Sovereignty and the Human Rights Act 1998, 61
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 53, 62 (2002).
110. David Bonner, et al., Judicial Approaches to the Human Rights Act, 52 INT’L
& COMP. L.Q. 549, 556 (2003). It arguably even requires judges to do so. Lord Lester of
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Under § 4 of the Human Rights Act, higher British courts can issue
a Declaration of Incompatibility if they cannot interpret a statute
creatively.111 This declaration has no legal effect – the litigant before the
court has no immediate remedy – but a Declaration of Incompatibility
does put political pressure on Parliament and the executive to remedy the
incompatible legislation.112 The executive has responded to every
Declaration of Incompatibility issued by the British courts, although
perhaps not as fully or quickly as some would like.113 Laws that affect
human rights can also bring the European Court of Human Rights into
play, which, under the European Convention on Human Rights, has the
power to rule that a British law is inconsistent with the European
Convention on Human Rights.114 Such an incompatibility requires the
United Kingdom, under its treaty obligations, to amend the offending
law.115
Despite these obstacles, due to its party control over Parliament and
the judiciary’s continued deference to Parliament, the British executive
has less reason to compromise or anticipate resistance from either the
legislature or judiciary than its American counterpart.
This is
particularly true for anti-terrorism legislation, for which the judiciary has
historically deferred to the executive.116
Herne Hill, The Art of the Possible - Interpreting Statutes Under the Human Rights Act,
1998 EUR. H.R. L. REV 665, 669.
111. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 4 (U.K).
112. Unfortunately, this does nothing to help the litigant, who is still bound by the
incompatible statute. For this reason, two commentators have noted that it is actually
better for the litigant if the court attempts to interpret the statute, which will have a
positive effect on the litigant, than to issue a Declaration of Incompatibility. Ian Leigh &
Laurence Lustgarten, Making Rights Real: The Courts, Remedies, and the Human Rights
Act, 58 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 509, 538 (1999) (“Issuance of a [Declaration of Incompatibility]
means that, in practical terms, the plaintiff has lost.”).
113. See, e.g., Liberty and JUSTICE Submission to the United Nations Human
Rights Committee: Response to the United Kingdom’s Sixth Periodic Report Under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [27] (the executive “waited until
shortly before the annual deadline for renewal to force alternative measures through
without sufficient time for the matter to be debated by Parliament”), available at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/ngos/liberty_justice_UK93.pdf
(last
accessed November 12, 2013).
114. Alyssa King, A Supreme Court, Supreme Parliament, and Transnational
National Rights, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 245, 246 (2010).
115. JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, SIXTEENTH REPORT OF SESSION 2006-07:
MONITORING THE GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE TO COURT JUDGMENTS FINDING BREACHES OF
HUMAN RIGHTS, HL 128, HC 728 at [46, 49] (U.K.).
116. Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, Impact of Terrorism on the Rule of Law, 43
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2. History of Terrorist Attacks and Legislation
In addition to government structure, the United Kingdom also
differs from the United States because of its familiarity with terrorist
attacks. The terrorist violence in Northern Ireland reached a peak in the
1960s and 1970s but even before then, the United Kingdom had dealt
with terrorist attacks, guerrilla warfare, and insurgency in its colonies.117
In 1922, the government of Northern Ireland authorized its police force
to arrest without warrant and then indefinitely detain “any person whom
he or she suspected of acting, or of having acted, or of being about to act,
in a manner prejudicial to the preservation of the peace or maintenance
of order.”118 These powers were upheld by the United Kingdom’s
highest court.119 The violence of the Irish Republican Army (IRA),
however, spurred the United Kingdom to re-introduce Internment (mass
detentions in camps) in 1971 and withdraw Home Rule from Northern
Ireland in 1972, which had allowed Northern Ireland to have an
independent Parliament.120
The first comprehensive pieces of anti-terrorism legislation were the
Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Acts, which were passed as
temporary measures from 1973 to 1978, against the backdrop of
increased bombing in Northern Ireland by the IRA.121 One of these laws,
the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act in 1974,
permitted detention of suspects for questioning for up to seven days
without trial or any other outside assessment.122 The Detention of
INT’L LAW. 13, 13-14 (2009).
117. Leandro Martínez-Peñas & Manuela Fernández-Rodríguez, Evolution of
British Law on Terrorism: From Ulster to Global Terrorism (1970-2010), in POST 9/11
AND THE STATE OF PERMANENT LEGAL EMERGENCY 201, 202 (Ancieto Masferrer ed.,
2012).
118. Brice Dickson, The Detention of Suspected Terrorists in Northern Ireland and
Great Britain, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 927, 931 (2009) (citing Civil Authorities (Special
Powers) Acts (Northern Ireland), 1956 S.R. & O. No. 1956/191, 11(1) (N. Ir.)).
119. Liversidge v. Anderson, [1942] A.C. 206, 213.
120. Martínez-Peñas & Fernández-Rodríguez, supra note 117, at 203; Dickson,
supra note 118, at 931.
121. Clive Walker, Clamping Down on Terrorism in the United Kingdom, 4 J. INT’L
CRIM. JUST. 1137, 1137-38 (2006). Prior to these “troubles,” the United Kingdom was
already familiar with terrorism in colonial conflicts in places like Palestine, Kenya,
Malaysia, Cyprus and Aden. Id. at 1137.
122. Fionnuala Ni Aolain, The Fortification of an Emergency Regime, 59 ALB. L.
REV. 1353, 1361-62 (1996).
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Terrorists (NI) Order 1972 allowed the Secretary of State for Northern
Ireland to make an “interim custody order,” which permitted detention
for twenty-eight days and, with the approval of an independent
Commissioner, the prisoner could be subject to indefinite detention under
a “detention order.”123
The British police practices under Internment led to several cases
before the European Court of Human Rights.124 Article 5 of the
European Convention on Human Rights permits a deprivation of liberty,
including detention, only under specific circumstances. Among those is
detention as part of criminal proceedings or “with a view to
deportation.”125 Moreover, detention is lawful for immigration purposes
as long as the deportation proceedings are diligently pursued and there
are procedural safeguards in place to ensure that the decision to detain is
not arbitrary.126 Generally speaking, the European Court of Human
Rights will not make an independent inquiry into whether the detention
is justified.127
However, the interim custody orders were not justiciable under the
European Convention on Human Rights because the United Kingdom
had derogated from Article 5 of the European Convention on Human
Rights due to its “public emergency.”128 Under Article 15 of the
European Convention on Human Rights, a state may derogate from
certain Articles, including Article 5, if there is a “war or public
emergency threatening the life of the nation” but the derogation may not
go further than what is “strictly required by the exigencies of the
situation” and the derogation may not be inconsistent with the state’s
other international law obligations.129
According to the European Court of Human Rights, a state of public
123. Dickson, supra note 118, at 932 (citing Detention of Terrorists Order
(Northern Ireland), 1972, SI 1972/1632 (N. Ir. 15), art. 4.).
124. Diane Webber, Preventative Detention in the Law of Armed Conflict:
Throwing Away the Key? 6 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 167, 171 (2012).
125. Hakimi, supra note 6, at 618-20.
126. Chahal v. United Kingdom, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 413, 465-66 (1996).
127. Hakimi, supra note 6, at 619.
128. Dickson, supra note 118, at 933.
129. European Convention on Human Rights, Art. 15. Article 15 allows Member
States to derogate or partially revoke another Article of the European Convention on
Human Rights in times of emergency if the derogation is publicly announced and
communicated to the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe. For a detailed analysis
of the European Convention on Human Rights’ derogation requirements, see Hughes,
supra note 6, at 4-6.
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emergency refers to “an exceptional situation of crisis or emergency
which affects the whole population and constitutes a threat to the
organised life of the community of which the State is composed.”130
Further, the emergency must be an actual emergency and not an
emergency that is merely perceived by the state.131 When determining
whether a measure taken under Article 15 is “strictly required by the
exigencies of the situation,” the European Court of Human Rights looks
to whether the measure is proportionate.132 The British Supreme Court133
has analyzed proportionality with regard to Article 15 derogations using
a three-part test: “whether: (i) the legislative objective is sufficiently
important to justify limiting a fundamental right; (ii) the measures
designed to meet the legislative objective are rationally connected to it;
and (iii) the means used to impair the right or freedom are no more than
is necessary to accomplish the objective.”134 The United Kingdom’s
derogation was upheld during Internment.135
The United Kingdom’s first permanent anti-terrorism statute was
the Terrorism Act 2000, which was meant to permanently set the United
Kingdom’s antiterrorism laws.136 A unique feature of the Terrorism Act
2000 was that it provided a new definition of terrorism that included
violent or seriously disruptive acts designed to threaten or influence the
government “for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or
ideological cause.”137 Most controversially, this Act allowed police to
search motor vehicles and people without being required to show
reasonable suspicion.138 The European Court of Human Rights later
declared this provision incompatible with Article 8 (right to privacy) of
130. Lawless v. Ireland (No.3) 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 15, 31 (1979-80).
131. Hughes, supra note 6, at 5.
132. A v. Sec’y of State for Home Dep’t, [2005] 2 A.C. 68, 102-103.
133. Until 2005, the highest court in the United Kingdom was called the House of
Lords Appellate Division and it was housed in Parliament. After the passage of the
Constitutional Reform Act, the British Supreme Court received its new name and, in
2010, its own building. The Constitutional Reform Act, 2005, c. 4 (U.K.). Members of
the House of Lords in Parliament were also no longer allowed to serve as judges. Id. To
avoid confusion, this Article will refer to the United Kingdom’s highest court as the
British Supreme Court even for cases that were heard before 2005.
134. Id.
135. Hakimi, supra note 6, at 619.
136. Dana Keith, In the Name of National Security or Insecurity?: The Potential
Indefinite Detention of Noncitizen Certified Terrorists in the United States and United
Kingdom in the Aftermath of September 11, 2011, 16 FLA. J. INT’L L. 405, 431 (2004).
137. Terrorism Act, 2000, § 1 (U.K.).
138. Id. § 44.
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the European Convention on Human Rights.139 The Anti-Terrorism
Act’s detention provisions were largely the same as previous temporary
provisions, including a forty-eight hour detention period for those
suspected of preparing or inciting terrorist acts.140 This Act was not in
effect long due to the events of September 11, 2001, which caused the
United Kingdom to engage in a massive overhaul of its antiterrorism
legislation.
3. The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act
As with the PATRIOT Act, the Anti-terrorism Act was drafted in
response to the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 and
was processed as an emergency measure.141 The Anti-terrorism Act
contained several broad provisions that were meant to address terrorism,
including the ability to seize assets, obtain confidential information from
public bodies, and detain suspected terrorists.142 It was introduced into
Parliament on October 12, 2001 and was signed into law approximately
two months later on December 14, 2001.143 The Anti-terrorism Act went
through Parliament rather quickly, but its passage was not smooth. As in
the United States, Opposition and Labour members of the House of
Commons criticized the bill’s rushed timetable – three days to go
through the Commons144 – which, they argued, did not give them enough
time for a proper debate.145 Other critics of the Anti-terrorism bill argued
that the executive used the threat of terror to pass intrusive legislation
that had previously been rejected infringed on people’s rights.146

139. Gillan v United Kingdom, 50 Eur. H.R. Rep. 45, [87] (2010).
140. Terrorism Act, 2000, § 41 (U.K.).
141. The bill had sixteen hours allotted in the House of Commons and only nine
days in the House of Lords. HOME OFFICE, ANTI-TERRORISM, CRIME AND SECURITY BILL –
PASSAGE THROUGH PARLIAMENT, Feb. 24, 2002; Dirk Haubrich, September 11, AntiTerror Laws and Civil Liberties: Britain, France and Germany Compared, 38 GOV’T &
OPPOSITION 3, 8 (2003).
142. Anti-terrorism, Crime & Security Act, 2001, c. 24-35 (U.K.).
143. Id. c. 21-35. The assent came the day after the bill had passed through the
legislative process.
144. Matthew Tempest, Lords Battle Looms over Anti-terror Bill, GUARDIAN
(U.K.),
Nov.
27,
2001,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/nov/27/september11.usa3.
145. Michael Kallenbach, MPs in Revolt over Terrorism Bill, DAILY TELEGRAPH
(U.K.), Nov. 23, 2001, available at 2001 WLNR 2790360.
146. Benedict Brogan, Anti-terror Reforms Too Intrusive, Say Ministers, DAILY
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4. Amendments in Parliament
Several members of the Labour Party defied the party whips and
voted against certain measures of the Anti-Terrorism Act such as
“powers that prevent the Home Secretary’s decisions being challenged
by judicial review.”147 Opposition from the Commons caused the
executive to add “sunset clauses” to the bill.148 Despite numerous other
objections, the bill passed through the Commons rather easily – only 23
members of the Labour party voted against it along with Conservatives
and Liberal-democrats – but it met strong opposition in the House of
Lords.149 One of the primary issues the Lords had with the bill was the
government’s ability to detain terror suspects without trial.150 As
expected, the House of Lords passed several amendments to the Antiterrorism bill, particularly in the areas of obtaining bank records and
detaining suspects without judicial review.151
Once back in the Commons, the executive again tried to rush the
bill through – giving the Commons another three days to look over the
amendments passed in the House of Lords.152 The executive was
particularly keen to have the Anti-terrorism Act passed by the time the
Prime Minister, Tony Blair, attended an EU summit in Belgium.153 To
put pressure on Parliament, David Blunkett, the Home Secretary, warned
that a terrorist attack could be imminent and criticized those delaying the
Anti-terrorism bill, noting that they did not have the security and

TELEGRAPH (U.K.), Nov. 24, 2001, available at 2001 WLNR 2752489.
147. Nigel Morris, MPs Prepare for Final Attack on Terror Bill, INDEPENDENT
(U.K.), Nov. 26, 2001, available at 2001 WLNR 7357905.
148. Tempest, supra note 144. Sunset clauses are provisions in a statute or
regulation that repeal all or portions of the law after a specific date, unless further
legislative action is taken to extend them.
149. Id.
150. Marie Woolf and Ben Russell, PARLIAMENT: LORDS - Peers Threaten to
Block Emergency Anti-terror Laws, INDEPENDENT (U.K.), Nov. 28, 2001, available at
2001 WLNR 7381724.
151. Ben Russell, PARLIAMENT & POLITICS: ANTI-TERROR BILL - Tory and
Lib Dem Peers Defeat Government over Police Powers, INDEPENDENT (U.K.), Dec. 7,
2001, available at 2001 WLNR 7410302.
152. Julian Glover, Lib Dems and Tories Ambush Government on Terror Bill,
GUARDIAN
(U.K.),
Dec.
5,
2001,
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2001/dec/05/houseofcommons.uk .
153. Id.
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intelligence information he had.154 Despite these warnings, the Lords
continued to water down the Anti-terrorism bill.155
Back in the House of Commons, several of the Lords’ amendments,
including judicial review for interned foreign terror suspects, were
quickly overturned.156 Prime Minister Tony Blair’s statements to the
Commons that the measures were essential to fight terrorism, and Home
Secretary David Blunkett’s concessions (including increasing the powers
of an immigration appeals commission), likely convinced Members of
the Commons to reverse the Lords’ changes.157 The bill again went back
to Lords who reinstated three of their former amendments.158 Blunkett
made further concessions to the Lords, including changing the way
appeals of detained terrorist suspects are handled, and both Houses
finally passed the bill.159
5. The Anti-terrorism Act and Indefinite Detention
Like the PATRIOT Act, the Anti-Terrorism Act gives the executive
the power to hold non-citizens who are certified as “international
terrorists” by the Secretary of State indefinitely without charge or trial.160
This power is given when non-nationals who are certified as
“international terrorists” are ordered to be removed from the United
Kingdom but cannot be because of legal or practical considerations such
as when the detainee would be subjected to torture in the only country to
which he or she can be deported.161 The European Court of Human

154. Andrew Grice, Blunkett Warns of Attack at Christmas, INDEPENDENT (U.K.),
Dec. 8, 2001, available at 2001 WLNR 7383323.
155. Michael Kallenbach, Lords Savage Labour over `Hurried' Laws Terrorism
Bill,
DAILY
TELEGRAPH
(U.K.),
Dec.
11,
2001,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1364947/Yesterday-in-Parliament.html.
156. Paul Waugh, PARLIAMENT & POLITICS: MPs Quash Series of Lords
Changes to Terrorism Bill, INDEPENDENT (U.K.), Dec. 13, 2001, available at 2001
WLNR 7192745.
157. Id.
158. Patrick Wintour, Ministers Shocked as Terror Bill Suffers Further Defeats in
Lords,
GUARDIAN
(U.K.),
Dec.
13,
2001,
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2001/dec/14/uk.september11.
159. John Deans, Blunkett U-Turns on Terror, DAILY MAIL (U.K.), Dec. 14, 2001,
available at 2001 WLNR 2675966.
160. Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, § 23(2) (U.K.).
161. JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, SECOND REPORT OF SESSION 2001-02: ANTITERRORISM, CRIME AND SECURITY BILL, H.L. 37, H.C. 372 [19] (U.K.).
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Rights has made it clear that such deportation would violate Article 3 of
the European Convention on Human Rights.162
Under the seminal case Soering v. United Kingdom, the European
Court of Human Rights prohibited the United Kingdom from deporting
Soering to the United States because he faced the death penalty there.163
Although the European Court of Human Rights held that the death
penalty itself would not necessarily violate Article 3 (prohibition of
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment), the
circumstances of the capital punishment system in Virginia, where
Soering would be sent, did implicate Article 3.164 More specifically, the
European Court of Human Rights held that the amount of time spent on
death row and the risk of rape or physical abuse combined with Soering’s
young age and mental state when he committed the crime meant that his
time on death row would be inhuman or degrading treatment.165 Further,
the European Court of Human Rights held that Member States could be
in violation of Article 3 if they extradite anyone to a country “where
substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person
concerned, if extradited, faces a real risk of being subjected to torture or
to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the requesting
country.”166 Accordingly, Soering prohibited the United Kingdom from
deporting anyone to a country where it is likely they would be tortured or
suffer inhuman treatment.
The United Kingdom was therefore left with a quandary as to what
to do with suspected terrorists who could be deported only to countries
where they would be likely to be tortured. The Anti-terrorism, Crime
and Security Act allowed the Home Secretary to detain these suspected
terrorists essentially indefinitely pending deportation because such
deportation would not be allowed under Article 3.167 As noted above,
this “solution” was one of many aspects of the Anti-terrorism Act that
were criticized as it went through Parliament and after it was passed into
law. Moreover, both Parliament (in the form of the Joint Committee on
162. Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 439 (1989). Article 3 states:
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.”
163. Id.
164. Id. at [111].
165. Id. The fact that Soering could also be extradited to Germany, where he was
from, and would not be subject to capital punishment, was also relevant to the court.
166. Id. at [91].
167. Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001 (U.K.).
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Human Rights) and the courts (both British courts and the European
Court of Human Rights) found the executive’s “solution” to also violate
the European Convention on Human Rights as it had during Internment.
6. Joint Committee on Human Rights Concerns
As the Anti-terrorism bill went through Parliament, the Joint
Committee on Human Rights warned that the speed with which the Antiterrorism bill was traveling through Parliament was dangerous and would
not allow Parliament to give such a complex bill proper scrutiny.168 The
Joint Committee also questioned whether the bill was justified by the
current international situation and noted that the bill could “fall foul of
the European Convention on Human rights.”169 Even before the AntiTerrorism Act was introduced to Parliament, the Joint Committee on
Human Rights voiced its concerns that the executive’s powers amounted
to indefinite detention rather than detention pending removal, which was
a clear violation of Article 5 (right to liberty and security of person) of
the European Convention on Human Rights, as announced in the
European Court of Human Rights case Chahal v United Kingdom.170
Although Article 5 would allow detention for immigration purposes
under Chahal, it would only do so if the detention was obviously
intended to be temporary until deportation.171 The Anti-Terrorism Act
contained no such contingency – it explicitly allowed indefinite detention
if the suspected alien terrorist could not be deported.172 Based on this
impending violation, the executive was forced to derogate from Article 5
of the European Convention on Human Rights.173
The Joint Committee on Human Rights explained the executive’s
approach thusly:
[the executive cannot] derogate from Article 3 without
168. Ben Russell, Parliament & Politics: Human Rights - MPs Warn Against
Rushing Through Anti-terror Bill, INDEPENDENT (U.K.), Nov. 17, 2001, available at 2001
WLNR 7198482.
169. Id.
170. Chahal v. United Kingdom, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 413 (1996); JOINT COMM. ON
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 161, at [23].
171. JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 161, at [19].
172. Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001 (U.K.).
173. Human Rights Act, 1998 (Designated Derogation) Order, 2001, S.I. 2001 No.
3641 (U.K.), available at http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/46e5564f2.pdf.
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‘denouncing’ the Convention as a whole and then reentering with a reservation relating to Article 3. If it took
this course, the Home Secretary [the British Secretary of
State] would be able (under powers he already
possesses) to deport foreign nationals without regard to
their possible fate in the country to which they were
returned. This the [executive] is not prepared to do. It
has therefore adopted a different route, but one which
still appears to necessitate derogation—but in this case
the derogation is from Article 5, which is permissible
under Article 15.174
The executive submitted the derogation order on the same day the AntiTerrorism Act was introduced, which, according to the executive,
allowed it to state that the Anti-Terrorism Act was compatible with the
Human Rights Act.175 According to the executive, the derogation was
the result of a “public emergency” resulting from the terrorist attacks on
the United States on September 11, 2001.176
In response to this derogation order, the Joint Committee on Human
Rights’ main concern was that the executive’s ability to indefinitely
detain persons with few legal safeguards or limitations on this power was
not justified by the executive’s articulated “public emergency” – threats
from Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups.177 The Joint Committee on
Human Rights’ concerns were partially due to the executive’s refusal to
provide the Joint Committee on Human Rights with any information to
support its “public emergency” stance. The Newton Committee, which
was charged with reviewing the Anti-Terrorism Act by the Home
Secretary, also advised revising the Anti-Terrorism Act so that
derogation was not necessary.178
The executive responded to some of the concerns of the Joint
174. JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 161, at [19].
175. JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, FIFTH REPORT OF SESSION 2002-03:
CONTINUANCE IN FORCE OF SECTIONS 21 TO 23 OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM, CRIME AND
SECURITY ACT 2001, H.L. 59, H.C. 462, at App’x 2, Letter from David Blunkett to the
Chairman of the Joint Committee on Human Rights (U.K.).
176. Human Rights Act 1998 (Designated Derogation) Order 2001, supra note 173.
177. JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 161, at [30].
178. PRIVY COUNSELLOR REVIEW COMM., ANTI-TERRORISM, CRIME AND SECURITY
ACT 2001 REVIEW: REPORT, Dec. 12, 2003 (last visited Oct. 20, 2013), available at
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2003/dec/atcsReport.pdf.
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Committee on Human Rights but not others.179 The executive refused to
amend the derogation order or change the provisions allowing for
indefinite detention of non-nationals suspected of terrorism.180 The
changes it did make favored stronger parliamentary review through
“sunset clauses” but did little to improve judicial review.181 Accordingly,
it appears that, due to the speed at which the Anti-Terrorism Act was
pushed through Parliament, the scarcity of evidence that Parliament
received, and the executive’s refusal to accept all of the Joint Committee
on Human Rights’ recommendations, Parliament did not have much of
an oversight role over the Anti-Terrorism Act before it became law.182
After the Anti-Terrorism Act was passed, commentators were
highly critical of the Anti-Terrorism Act.183 One of the first critics of the
Anti-terrorism Act was Lord Woolf, the Lord Chief Justice of England
and Wales.184 He argued that the Anti-terrorism Act would damage the
United Kingdom’s reputation abroad and promised that the judges that
were to hear aliens’ detention challenges would release them if the
detention was not “based on proper evidence.”185 Days after the bill was
passed, eight suspected terrorists were detained by immigration officers
under the Home Secretary’s new powers.186 The media also noted the
potential human rights violations inherent in the Anti-Terrorism Act’s
indefinite detention provisions and the plans of public interest groups to
litigate against it.187 The Joint Committee on Human Rights and the

179. JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, FIFTH REPORT OF SESSION 2001-02: ANTICRIME AND SECURITY BILL: FURTHER REPORT, H.L. 51, H.C. 420, at [8, 19]
(U.K.).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Stephen Tierney, Determining the State of Exception: What Role for
Parliament and the Courts?, 68 MOD. L. REV. 668, 672 (2005). See also Janet L. Hiebert,
Parliamentary Review of Terrorism Measures, 68 MOD. L. REV. 676, 676 (2005).
183. Mark Elliot, United Kingdom: The “War on Terror,” U.K.-Style – The
Detention and Deportation of Suspected Terrorists, 8 INT’L J. CONST. L. 131, 133 (2010).
184. Joshua Rozenberg, Woolf Attacks New Terror Law, DAILY TELEGRAPH (U.K.),
Dec. 17, 2001, available at 2001 WLNR 2793920.
185. Id.
186. Ian Burrell & Jason Bennetto, Blunkett Provokes Anger by Using New Terror
Laws to Arrest Eight Suspects, INDEPENDENT (U.K.), Dec. 20, 2001, available at 2001
WLNR 7069488
187. Don Mackay, War on Terror: Fight for Peace: 8 Seized in “Terror” Swoop,
MIRROR (U.K.), Dec. 20, 2001, available at 2001 WLNR 9450421; Paul Waugh,
Campaign Against Terrorism: Terror Suspects to be Rounded Up Under New Law,
INDEPENDENT (U.K.), Dec.15, 2001, available at 2001 WLNR 7361497; Burrell &
TERRORISM,
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executive resumed discussions when the Anti-Terrorism Act was due for
renewal, but no major changes were made to the legislation.188 Talks
between the Joint Committee on Human Rights and the executive
resumed again when litigation commenced against the Anti-Terrorism
Act. However, the executive refused to alter the legislation absent a
judicial decision.189
7. The British Supreme Court Justices Issue a Declaration of
Incompatibility
In 2004, the British Supreme Court considered in A and Others
whether the Anti-Terrorism Act was incompatible with the European
Convention on Human Rights.190 A and Others was brought by a group
of foreign nationals who had been certified by the Secretary of State as
suspected international terrorists under § 21 of the Anti-terrorism Act.191
The appellants could not be deported under Article 3 of the European
Convention on Human Rights and they were being held without charge
or trial under the United Kingdom’s derogation from Article 5.192 The
appellants argued that their detention violated Article 5 of the European
Convention on Human Rights and was discriminatory against nonnationals in violation of Article 14 of the European Convention on
Human Rights.193
The Law Lords (as they were then called) first decided that the
executive had proved that a state of emergency existed and that it was
acceptable for the executive to derogate from Article 5 of the European
Convention on Human Rights. This decision was made with some
“misgivings” or “hesitation” by some judges and was not unanimous. 194
Bennetto, supra note 186. But see New Law Cannot Touch Briton Who Recruited for
Taliban, DAILY MAIL (U.K.), Dec. 18, 2001, available at 2001 WLNR 2676486
(lamenting that the Anti-Terrorism Act allows only foreign terrorism suspects to be
“arrested without a trial.”).
188. JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, SIXTH REPORT OF SESSION 2003-04: ANTITERRORISM, CRIME AND SECURITY ACT 2001: STATUTORY REVIEW AND CONTINUANCE OF
PART 4, HL 38, HC 381 (U.K.).
189. JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 175, at [36].
190. A v. Sec’y of State for Home Dep’t, [2004] UKHL 56.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at [26] (Lord Bingham); [78] (Lord Nicholls); [97] (Lord Hoffman); [165]
(Lord Rodger).
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As to whether the Anti-Terrorism Act violated other Articles in the
European Convention on Human Rights, such as Article 14’s prohibition
on discrimination, the executive argued that the judiciary should defer to
Parliament because Parliament should be the branch that determines
what response to terrorism is appropriate.195
Previously, the Law Lords might have accepted this argument and
deferred to Parliament. Instead, this argument gave Lord Bingham great
pause and caused him to draw on a diverse group of sources, including a
United States Supreme Court decision, to examine the appropriate roles
for courts and the legislature.196 Lord Bingham ultimately decided that it
was entirely appropriate for the Lords to review the compatibility of the
Anti-Terrorism Act, and rejected the Attorney General’s attempt to
“stigmatise judicial decision-making as in some way undemocratic.”197
The judiciary, Lord Bingham, insisted, was acting within its democratic
mandate from Parliament.198
The majority of Lords ultimately found that the Anti-Terrorism
Act’s response to the threat of terrorism (in particular the ability to
indefinitely detain suspected non-nationals) was disproportionate and
discriminatory,199 and, therefore in violation of the European Convention
on Human Rights.200 In doing so, they were heavily influenced by the
Newton Committee report and the comments of the European
Commissioner for Human Rights in his Opinion 1/2002 (28 August
2002).201 The Supreme Court justices also referred to the Joint
Committee on Human Rights’ reports throughout their discussion of the
issues.202 As a result of its findings, the Supreme Court issued a
Declaration of Incompatibility,203 which left the executive and
Parliament to remedy the Anti-terrorism Act.
The executive responded to A and Others with outrage to the press,

195. Id. at [37] (Lord Bingham).
196. Id. at [39] (Lord Bingham).
197. Id. at [42] (Lord Bingham).
198. Id. at [42] (Lord Bingham).
199. The Anti-Terrorism Act was found to be discriminatory because it made an
impermissible distinction between nationals and non-nationals. Only non-nationals were
subjected to indefinite detention. A v. Sec’y of State for Home Dep’t, [2004] UKHL 56.
200. Id. at [43] (Lord Bingham); [84] (Lord Nicholls); [133, 138] (Lord Hope);
[159] (Lord Scott); [189] (Lord Rodger); [231] (Baroness Hale).
201. Id. at [34], [43] (Lord Bingham).
202. Id. at [65] (Lord Bingham).
203. Id. at [73] (Lord Bingham).
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calling the decision “simply wrong.” 204 Incoming Home Secretary
Charles Clarke also promised that “the detainees will all remain in prison
indefinitely regardless of the ruling.”205 The press was surprisingly not
antagonistic to A and Others, calling the Anti-Terrorism Act
“draconian”206 and “misconceived.”207 Even some of the British tabloids,
which are typically very conservative, presented both sides of the
issue.208 The substantial and mainly positive press that the Supreme
Court justices’ ruling received, as well as the subsequent resignations of
the appointed detainees’ barristers, was probably instrumental in the
executive’s decision to change its antiterrorism legislation.209
8. The Prevention of the Terrorism Act
The executive had until March 2005 to decide whether to renew the
indefinite detention provisions in the Anti-terrorism Act or attempt to
revise the legislation in response to the Declaration of Incompatibility
issued by Supreme Court in A and Others and it had until March 2006
before the Anti-terrorism Act’s “sunset clause” caused that provision to
lapse completely.210 Although the new Home Secretary, Charles Clarke,
204. Neil Mackay, Home Secretary Charles Clarke is Already Embroiled in a
Battle Between Law Lords and the Government. At Stake is British Democracy, SUNDAY
HERALD (U.K.), Dec. 19, 2004, at 13, available at 2004 WLNR 14422492.
205. Id.; Stephen Howard, No Freedom For Detainees; Government Defies Law
Lords' Ruling, DAILY POST (U.K.), Dec. 17, 2004.
206. Mackay, supra note 204. See also Martin Bright, Is a Pair of Boots All that
Stand Between 11 Untried Detainees and Their Liberty?, OBSERVER (U.K.), Dec. 19,
2004, available at 2004 WLNR 23621486 (describing the Government’s flimsy
evidence).
207. Leading Article: The Law Lords Have Made an Admirable Defence of Our
Fundamental Freedoms, INDEPENDENT (U.K.), Dec. 17, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR
14254400; see also Bright, supra note 206.
208. Ben Taylor, Crisis as Lords Say Anti-terror Laws are Illegal, DAILY MAIL
(U.K.), Dec. 17, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 14286992. But see The Government's
First Duty is to Keep Us Safe, DAILY TELEGRAPH (U.K.), Dec. 17, 2004,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/telegraph-view/3613615/The-Governments-firstduty-is-to-keep-us-safe.html (blaming the problem on the European Convention on
Human Rights and the “Europeanisation” of the British legal system).
209. Clare Dyer, Government Prepares to Unveil Changes to Anti terror Laws,
GUARDIAN (U.K.), Jan. 17, 2005; Jason Bennetto & Ben Russell, Reform of Terror Laws
on Labour Agenda, INDEPENDENT (U.K.), Dec. 21, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR
14473597.
210. Patrick Wintour & Alan Travis, Blair Faces Dilemma on Law and Order,
GUARDIAN (U.K.), Dec. 17, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 23592011.
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originally stated that he would attempt to renew the provisions of the
Anti-terrorism Act,211 the executive instead introduced the Prevention of
Terrorism Bill in the House of Commons on February 22, 2005.
Instead of indefinite detention, the Prevention of Terrorism Bill
gave the Secretary of State power to place an individual under house
arrest or place such other restrictions on his or her movements.212 These
restrictions included prohibiting telephone usage and limiting how long
the person could be outside of his or her dwelling. 213 The executive
called these powers “derogating control orders.”214 In order to obtain a
control order, the Secretary of State was required to apply to the High
Court of England and Wales and show that he or she had reasonable
grounds for suspecting the controlee is or has been involved in terrorismrelated activity, and that the control order was necessary to protect the
public from a risk of terrorism.215
The court was required to permit the control order unless the
Secretary of State’s decision is “obviously flawed” and it can do so in the
absence of the controlee.216 Once the control order was issued, the
controlee was entitled to a hearing but the controlee and his or her
attorney could be excluded from the hearing to ensure that no
information was revealed to the controlee that is contrary to the public
interest as long as the controlee’s special advocate was provided that
information.217 If the court found that the Secretary of State’s control
order was not “flawed,” the control order would remain in place.218
9. Parliament’s Response
The Prevention of Terrorism Bill went through Parliament in a little
over two weeks so it would be in place before the (human rights
incompatible) detention regime of the Anti-Terrorism Act expired. The
Prevention of Terrorism Bill was debated in the Commons the day after
211. Id.
212. Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, § 1 (U.K.).
213. Id.; Clive Walker, Keeping Control of Terrorists Without Losing Control of
Constitutionalism, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1395, 1412 (2007).
214. John Ip, Comparative Perspectives on the Detention of Terrorist Suspects, 16
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 773, 799 (2007).
215. Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, §§ 2(1), 3(1)(a), 15(1)(c) (U.K.).
216. Id. §§ 3(2)(b), 3(5).
217. United Kingdom Civil Procedure Rules 76.22(1), 76.23, 76.28(1).
218. Prevention of Terrorism Act,2005, § 3(13) (U.K.).
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it was introduced and the Joint Committee on Human Rights’ report
came three days after its introduction to the Commons, in time for the
Common’s standing committee to debate it.219 The Joint Committee on
Human Rights welcomed the executive’s acceptance of the Law Lords’
ruling in A and Others, its decision to no longer derogate from Article 5
of the European Convention on Human Rights, and its decision to move
away from indefinite detention to more flexible control orders.220
However, it also questioned the necessity of control orders and the lack
of judicial involvement before those orders were issued.221 The
Commons debates likewise focused on judicial involvement in the
issuance and review of control orders.222 Despite these debates and the
Joint Committee on Human Rights’ concerns, the Prevention of
Terrorism Bill quickly passed through the Commons and went to the
Lords unamended.
The executive tabled amendments to the Prevention of Terrorism
Bill while it was being considered by the Lords and the Joint Committee
on Human Rights published a report on those amendments two days
later.223 As with the Anti-Terrorism Act, the amendments partially
addressed some of the Joint Committee on Human Rights’ concerns.
Specifically, the executive allowed increased (but still limited) judicial
review of control orders.224 Although the speed of the Prevention of
Terrorism Bill’s passage made it impossible for the Joint Committee on
Human Rights to fully scrutinize these amendments, the Joint Committee
on Human Rights still found fault with the amended bill and urged the
executive to allow for greater judicial supervision.225 These pleas went
unheard and the Prevention of Terrorism Bill was not amended again.
The executive refused to change its current approach absent a ruling

219. JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, NINTH REPORT OF SESSION 2004-05:
PREVENTION OF TERRORISM BILL: PRELIMINARY REPORT, H.L. 61, H.C. 389 (U.K.).
220. Id. at [3].
221. Id. at [5-13].
222. See, e.g., 431 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.)10 1762 (U.K.) (Mr. Clarke).
223. JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, TENTH REPORT OF SESSION 2004-05:
PREVENTION OF TERRORISM BILL, H.L. 68, H.C. 334 (U.K.).
224. Id.
225. JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, FOURTEENTH REPORT OF SESSION 2006-07:
GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE COMMITTEE'S EIGHTH REPORT OF THIS SESSION:
COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: DRAFT PREVENTION OF TERRORISM
ACT 2005 (CONTINUANCE IN FORCE OF SECTIONS 1 TO 9 ORDER 2007), HL 106, HC 539
(U.K.).
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from the Supreme Court.226 The Prevention of Terrorism Bill became
law on March 11, 2005.
Despite the Joint Committee on Human Rights’ continuing concerns
about existing control orders, when the control order provisions of the
Prevention of Terrorism Act came up for renewal in February 2006, the
executive decided to renew them without amendment.227 The executive
stated that it intended to review the orders again a year later, after the
executive had received a report by Lord Carlisle, who had been
appointed by the Home Secretary to review the Prevention of Terrorism
Act.228 The executive also wanted to wait until after the resolution of
existing cases against the Prevention of Terrorism Act.229
10. The British Supreme Court’s Rulings
As noted by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, the Prevention
of Terrorism Act’s control orders raised the same Article 5 concerns as
indefinite detention.230 Litigation soon followed its enactment and the
executive took notice of lower court activity that resulted from the
Prevention of Terrorism Act. For example, the executive lowered the
maximum number of curfew hours in some cases after the Court of
Appeal held that some of the control orders’ curfew requirements were
so restrictive that they amounted to a violation of liberty under Article
5.231 However, no major actions were to be taken until the Supreme
Court had ruled on the issue. The executive noted in its July 2007
Consultation Paper that it did not want to pre-empt any forthcoming
Supreme Court judgments and would consider “whether any further
changes to the control order system are necessary in light of” these

226. Id.
227. JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, TWELFTH REPORT OF SESSION 2005-06:
COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: DRAFT PREVENTION OF TERRORISM
ACT 2005 (CONTINUANCE IN FORCE OF SECTIONS 1 TO 9) ORDER 2006, H.L. 122, H.C. 915
(U.K.).
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, TENTH REPORT OF SESSION 2007-08:
COUNTER–TERRORISM POLICY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (NINTH REPORT): ANNUAL RENEWAL
OF CONTROL ORDERS LEGISLATION 2008, H.L. 57, H.C. 356, Letter from Home Secretary
dated Feb. 18, 2008, at App’x 2 (U.K.).
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judgments.232
Subsequently, on October 31, 2007, the Supreme Court gave
judgments in three cases concerning significant aspects of the control
orders regime, upon which the Joint Committee on Human Rights had
previously reported. The case of JJ concerned the point at which the
obligations in a control order become so restrictive that they amount to a
deprivation of liberty; MB concerned whether the procedures in control
order cases were compatible with the right of the controlled person to
due process; and E concerned the extent of the executive’s duties under
the Prevention of Terrorism Act to keep the possibility of criminal
prosecution under review.233
In JJ, the Supreme Court ruled by a majority of three to two that the
six control orders at issue, which had curfews of 18 hours per day,
deprived the plaintiffs of their liberty, and therefore breached Article 5 of
the European Convention on Human Rights.234 The control orders were
therefore quashed. However, due to the nature of British judicial
decisions – each judge writes a separate opinion even if they agree with
each other – the majority of judges had different views on why the
control orders were incompatible with the European Convention on
Human Rights.
Speaking as part of the majority, Lord Bingham believed that,
although not technically prison:
[t]he effect of the 18-hour curfew, coupled with the
effective exclusion of social visitors, meant that the
controlled persons were in practice in solitary
confinement for this lengthy period every day for an
indefinite duration, with very little opportunity for
contact with the outside world, with means insufficient
to permit provision of significant facilities for selfentertainment and with knowledge that their flats were

232. HOME OFFICE, POSSIBLE MEASURES FOR INCLUSION IN A COUNTER TERRORISM
BILL, July 25, 2007, at [58], http://www.statewatch.org/news/2007/jul/uk-ct-billconsultation.pdf.
233. Sec’y of State for Home Dep’t v. JJ, [2007] UKHL 45; Sec’y of State for
Home Dep’t v. MB, [2007] UKHL 46; Sec’y of State for Home Dep’t v. E, [2007]
UKHL 47.
234. Sec’y of State for Home Dep’t v. JJ, [2007] UKHL 45, [24] (Lord Bingham),
[63] (Baroness Hale) and [105] (Lord Brown).
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liable to be entered and searched at any time.235
Lord Bingham compared this isolation and the fact that the Home
Secretary “wholly regulated” their lives, made their living conditions
similar to that of prisoners, except breaches of control orders were
subject to more severe punishment than infractions made by traditional
prisoners.236 Baroness Hale agreed that the control orders amounted to a
deprivation of liberty and refused to speculate as to what length of
curfew would not mean a deprivation of liberty.237
The final member of the majority, Lord Brown, stated that the
existing control orders violated Article 5 but he also indicated that
control orders that had curfews of up to sixteen hours per day would not,
in his opinion, amount to a deprivation of liberty.238 The other two
judges, Lords Hoffman and Carswell, believed that the control orders did
not amount to a deprivation of liberty.239 Lord Brown’s statement led the
executive to construe JJ and Others as holding that curfews of up to 16
hours did not violate the European Convention on Human Rights. The
Secretary of State consequently raised curfews in four cases to 16
hours.240
Unsurprisingly, the Joint Committee on Human Rights disapproved
of the Home Secretary’s reading of JJ and made several
recommendations to amend the Prevention of Terrorism Act in light of
that judgment.241 Specifically, the Joint Committee on Human Rights
recommended a twelve hour limit on curfew hours and noted that,
depending on the other restrictions placed on an individual, in some
instances, curfews of twelve hours could still be found to violate the right
to liberty.242 The Joint Committee on Human Rights warned that the
European Court of Human Rights would surely rule on the issue in time
and called for Parliament to give better guidance as to what it considered
to be the appropriate limits on control orders so that individuals’ liberty
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

Id. at [24] (Lord Bingham).
Id.
Id. at [63] (Baroness Hale).
Id. at [105] and [108].
Id. at [54, 84].
JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, NINTH REPORT OF SESSION 2007-08:
COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (EIGHTH REPORT): COUNTERTERRORISM BILL, HL 50, HC 199, at [55-73] (U.K.).
241. Id.
242. Id.
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would be respected.243
In the second case considered by the Supreme Court, MB, the
Secretary of State applied to the court for permission to make a nonderogating control order to prevent MB, a British citizen, from travelling
to Iraq to fight against the United Kingdom.244 The application was
made without notice to MB and was supported by an open and a closed
statement; MB never received notice of the application and, after it was
granted, was never told what the closed statement said about him. 245 MB
argued that he was not given a fair hearing as required by Article 6 of the
European Convention on Human Rights.246 The second plaintiff, AF,
was also placed under a non-derogating control order, which restricted
his visitors and even which mosque he could attend, and he was not
given the closed material that formed the basis of his control order. 247
AF argued that his rights under Article 5 (deprivation of liberty) and
Article 6 (right to a fair trial) had been violated.248
The Supreme Court held by a majority of four to one that the
procedures contained in the Prevention of Terrorism Act (and the Rules
of Court made under it) would not be compatible with Article 6’s right to
a fair hearing to the extent that they could lead to the upholding of a
control order where the state never disclosed the essence of the case
against the controlled person.249 The Supreme Court refused to issue a
Declaration of Incompatibility as it did when reviewing the AntiTerrorism Act, but it did use Section 3 of the Human Rights Act to read
additional words into the legislation guaranteeing the right of the
controlled person to a fair hearing.250
This judgment was subsequently interpreted by Lord Carlile as
rejecting the compatibility challenge. Lord Carlile also stated that the
state of the law post-MB was uncertain and asserted that that uncertainty
would “ensure the most careful consideration” of each case by the
executive.251 The Joint Committee on Human Rights was not satisfied
243. Id.
244. Sec’y of State for Home Dep’t v. MB, [2007] UKHL 46.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Lord Carlile of Berriew Q.C., Third Report of the Independent Reviewer
Pursuant to Section 14(3) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 [61], Feb. 18, 2008
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with this assurance and advocated the adoption of its prior
recommendations for improving the fairness of the special advocate
regime such as allowing the controlled person greater access to the
information being used as the basis of the control order and greater
access to the special advocate that was to serve as his or her attorney. 252
The executive responded that the additional language inserted into the
Prevention of Terrorism Act by the Supreme Court effectively ensured
that the Act complied with the European Convention on Human
Rights.253
In E, the final Prevention of Terrorism Act case considered by the
Supreme Court, the Supreme Court held that it was the Secretary of
State’s duty to continue to review the possibility of prosecuting
controlled persons so that individuals would not remain under control
orders indefinitely.254 E was subjected to a non-derogating control order
and in 2005, the Secretary of State learned of two criminal judgments in
Belgium implicating E in terrorist activities.255 However, the Secretary of
State did not disclose this information to E or to the chief officer of the
relevant police force.256 Instead, the Secretary of State continued to
renew the control order, despite the police chief informing the Secretary
of State under the requirements of the Prevention of Terrorism Act that
the police chief did not believe there was sufficient evidence to continue
to keep E under a control order. E sued under Article 5 for deprivation
of liberty. 257
According to the Supreme Court, “prosecution should be the
preferred course” and would be better for both society and the accused
individual.258 In his report, Lord Carlile welcomed the idea of increased
prosecutions.259 In response to these comments, the Joint Committee on
Human Rights noted that “no individual who has been made the subject

(U.K.).
252. JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 240, at 55-73.
253. JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, TWENTIETH REPORT OF SESSION 2007-08:
COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (TENTH REPORT): COUNTERTERRORISM BILL, H.L. 108, H.C. 554, at 91 (U.K.).
254. Sec’y of State for Home Dep’t v. E, [2007] UKHL 47, [26] (appeal taken from
Eng.).
255. Id. at 6.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Lord Carlile of Berriew Q.C., supra note 251, at 4, 74.
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of a control order has subsequently been prosecuted for a terrorism
offense, other than for breach of a control order” and recommended that
an amendment imposing an express duty on the Secretary of State to
review individuals under control orders every three months. 260The
executive did not take that advice and instead construed E as clarifying
the Secretary of State’s duties and stated that it believed that it need not
make any legislative amendment in response.261
11. The Counter Terrorism Act
After these Supreme Court judgments, the executive published the
Counter-Terrorism Bill on January 24, 2008. The Counter-Terrorism
Bill, although containing numerous amendments, did not address any of
the Supreme Court decisions and gave even more expansive powers to
the executive. Most controversially, the executive wanted to raise the
amount of time a person could be held in custody without being charged
with a crime from twenty-eight days to forty-two days.262 In response to
the Counter-Terrorism Bill, the Joint Committee on Human Rights issued
numerous reports recommending amendments to fully address the
Supreme Court’ decisions and better protect human rights.263 The Joint
Committee on Human Rights seemed surprised that the executive had not
already addressed its concerns, especially since the Supreme Court had
expressed similar concerns and had even quashed some control orders in
JJ and used § 3 of the Human Rights Act to read words into the
Prevention of Terrorism Act in MB.264
Lord Carlile published his third annual review of the control orders
on February 18, 2008, three days before the renewal order was due to be
debated in the House of Commons.265 His conclusions were the same as

260. JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 231, at 65, 72.
261. JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 253, at 72.
262. JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, TWENTY-FIRST REPORT OF SESSION 2007-08:
COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (ELEVENTH REPORT): 42 DAYS AND
PUBLIC EMERGENCIES, H.L. 116, H.C. 635 (U.K.).
263. JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 253; JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, supra note 240, at 40; JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 231, at 5-14;
JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, TWENTY-FIFTH REPORT OF SESSION 2007-08: COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (TWELFTH REPORT): ANNUAL RENEWAL OF 28
DAYS 2008, H.L. 132, H.C. 825, at 12-17, 21-62 (U.K.).
264. JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 231, at [37, 53].
265. Lord Carlile of Berriew Q.C., supra note 251, at [76].
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those in his second review.266 Namely, that “as a last resort (only), the
control order system as operated currently in its non-derogating form is a
justifiable and proportional safety valve for the proper protection of civil
society.”267 The executive used this report to urge Parliament to renew
the legislation and praised the Prevention of Terrorism Act as “strik[ing]
the right balance between safeguarding society and safeguarding the
rights of the individual.”268 The executive also stated that the Supreme
Court’s “judgments on control orders upheld the control orders regime.
As such, Parliament should recognize the importance of control orders
and support the legislation’s renewal for a further year.”269
The Joint Committee on Human Rights argued, however, that
Carlile’s third report did differ from the previous reports in that, in the
third report, Lord Carlile believed that control orders should not last
more than two years except in very exceptional circumstances.270 The
executive made no mention of this finding in its press release.271 The
executive refused to accept any of the Joint Committee on Human
Rights’ amendments at first and, despite public pressure and defection
amongst Labor members of the House of Commons regarding the fortytwo days detention power, the Counter-Terrorism Bill passed the
Commons and went to the Lords. In the Lords, it was subject to
substantial debate and criticism with the result that the Lords voted
overwhelmingly (309 votes to 118) to amend the bill to remove the fortytwo days provision.272 In response, the executive decided to drop the
forty-two days power, which was the primary point of contention.273 The
remaining provisions remained but the executive agreed to look at a few
of the issues the Joint Committee on Human Rights had raised, including
those relating to control orders.274 The Counter-Terrorism Act was
signed into law on November 26, 2008.

266. Id.
267. Id.
268. HOME OFFICE, LORD CARLILE REPORT: CONTROL ORDERS ARE "JUSTIFIABLE
AND PROPORTIONAL", Feb. 18, 2008 (U.K.).
269. Id.
270. Lord Carlile of Berriew Q.C., supra note 251, at [50-51].
271. HOME OFFICE, supra note 268.
272. 704 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2007-08) 542-43 (U.K.).
273. Sam Coates, House of Lords Deals Fatal Blow to 42-day Terror Detention
Plans, TIMES (U.K.), Oct. 14, 2008.
274. JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, SECOND REPORT OF SESSION 2008-09: THE
WORK OF THE COMMITTEE IN 2007-08, H.L. 10, H.C. 92, at App’x Annex 3 (U.K.).
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12. Post Counter-Terrorism Act - Renewal of Control Orders and a
New Government
Since the Counter-Terrorism Act was passed, existing control orders
have had to be renewed several times, which has caused the Joint
Committee on Human Rights to repeatedly report on the human rights
implications of the control orders.275 In these reports, the Joint
Committee on Human Rights has asked for further changes to be made
such as requiring greater parliamentary oversight of control orders and
requiring the Secretary of State to report more substantially on existing
control orders.276
One source of authority the Joint Committee on Human Rights has
repeatedly cited is the European Court of Human Rights, which held that
the indefinite detention permitted under the Anti-Terrorism Act violated
Article 5.277 In addition to Joint Committee on Human Rights reports on
the Anti-Terrorism Act, the European Court of Human Rights also
deferred to the Supreme Court’s decision that measures taken under the
Anti-Terrorism Act were not necessary to combat the United Kingdom’s
terrorism “emergency” and held that the derogation from Article 5 was
disproportionate.278 The European Court of Human Rights agreed with
the Joint Committee on Human Rights that that the Anti-Terrorism Act
was incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights
because detainees were not given the evidence that was being used to
detain them.279
Despite these criticisms, the United Kingdom’s anti-terrorism
275. JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 227, at [37, 53]; JOINT COMM. ON
HUMAN RIGHTS, EIGHTH REPORT OF SESSION 2006-07: COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY AND
HUMAN RIGHTS: DRAFT PREVENTION OF TERRORISM ACT 2005 (CONTINUANCE IN FORCE
OF SECTIONS 1 TO 9) ORDER 2007, H.L. 60, H.C. 365 at 63 (U.K.).
276. JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 227, at [37, 53]; see also A v.
United Kingdom, 49 Eur. H.R. Rep. 29, [171] (2009).
277. JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 227, at [37, 53].
278. Id. at 190. One scholar has called the European Court of Human Rights’
reliance on the British Supreme Court “parasitic.” Elliot, supra note 183, at 136.
279. JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, NINTH REPORT OF SESSION 2009-10:
COUNTER–TERRORISM POLICY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (SIXTEENTH REPORT): ANNUAL
RENEWAL OF CONTROL ORDERS LEGISLATION 2010, H.L. 64, H.C. 395 (U.K.); A v.
United Kingdom, 49 Eur. H.R. Rep. 29 [223-24] (2009). Because it can take the
European Court of Human Rights up to five years to hear a case, the European Court of
Human Rights did not review the Anti-Terrorism Act until 2009.
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legislation did not substantially change until the political composition of
the legislature and executive changed. When the Liberal-Democrats and
the Conservatives formed a Coalition Government in 2010, they put forth
a “Programme for Government” that promised to “introduce safeguards
against the misuse of anti-terrorism legislation.”280 As a result of that
promise, the Coalition Government published a Review of CounterTerrorism and Security Powers on January 26, 2011. That report
concluded that the Prevention of Terrorism Act should be repealed, and
control orders should be replaced by increased surveillance of terrorism
suspects and a less intrusive and more focused system: Terrorism
Prevention and Investigation Measures (“TPIMs”).281
TPIMs require suspected terrorists to sleep at night in an agreed
upon location but allow them to move freely during the day and use the
internet and cellular phones.282 In sharp contrast to the Labour
Government’s efforts, the Coalition Government also reduced the
amount of days of pre-charge detention from twenty-eight to fourteen.283
When making those changes, the executive clearly took the European
Court of Human Rights’ holding in A v. United Kingdom into account.
The Coalition Government’s report is rife with references to the
European Court of Human Rights and concerns that existing antiterrorism legislation violated the European Convention on Human
Rights, which shows the continuing influence of the European Court of
Human Rights.284 The Joint Committee on Human Rights welcomed
these changes and urged the executive to suspend control orders until
TPIMs were in place, which the executive refused to do.285 It is unclear
what form the United Kingdom’s anti-terrorism legislation will take next.

280. CABINET OFFICE, THE COALITION: OUR PROGRAMME FOR GOVERNMENT 11
(2010) (U.K.).
281. HOME OFFICE, REVIEW OF COUNTER-TERRORISM AND SECURITY POWERS:
REVIEW FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, Cm 8004 at 7 (2011) (U.K.).
282. Duncan Gardham, Terrorist Suspects Allowed to Move Freely, DAILY
TELEGRAPH (U.K.), Jan. 27, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 1633285.
283. HOME OFFICE, supra note 281, at 6.
284. Id. at 10, 11, 17, 20, 31, 35, 41, 43, 45.
285. JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, EIGHTH REPORT OF SESSION 2010-11:
RENEWAL OF CONTROL ORDERS LEGISLATION 2011, H.L. 106, H.C. 838 (U.K.). The
Government may have been bolstered by Lord Carlile’s Sixth Report, which found that,
despite political controversy, control orders were working “reasonably well.” Lord
Carlile of Berriew QC, Sixth Report of the Independent Reviewer Pursuant to Section
14(3) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, at 1 (2011) (U.K.).
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13. Government branches’ Influence on United Kingdom’s Antiterrorism Legislation
The United Kingdom’s anti-terrorism legislation has changed
significantly and repeatedly since September 11, 2001 due to the
concerns of the various branches for human rights and the conflicts
between the branches that resulted from these concerns. Unlike courts in
the United States, British courts had never ruled on indefinite detention
until the Anti-Terrorism Act because they were barred from hearing
human rights cases until the Human Rights Act was passed. Due to the
powers given to the judiciary and legislature by the Human Rights Act,
the Joint Committee on Human Rights and the Supreme Court (with
support from the European Court of Human Rights) forced the executive
to change the United Kingdom’s antiterrorism legislation. All three
actors had an impact but their combination was crucial for legislative
change.
14. Influence of the Judiciary
The United Kingdom’s anti-terrorism legislation saga shows that the
influence of the British judiciary and the European Court of Human
Rights is very strong. The executive was apparently aware of the
judiciary’s ability to interfere with the Anti-Terrorism Act while it was
drafting the Anti-Terrorism Act because it anticipated that judges
(domestic or European) could use Article 5 to invalidate the AntiTerrorism Act’s provision for indefinite detention of non-citizens who
were suspected terrorists. In fact, the Derogation Order has been seen by
some commentators as the executive’s attempt to wrest power away from
the judiciary both in the United Kingdom and the European Court of
Human Rights.286 By derogating from Article 5, the executive restricted
available rights under the Anti-Terrorism Act and effectively eliminated
the European Court of Human Rights’ ability to determine whether those
rights had been breached. The executive said that it intended to
286. Danny Nicol, The Human Rights Act and the Politicians, 24 LEGAL STUD. 451,
463 (2004).
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essentially remove the European Court of Human Rights from the
equation and that it could decide for itself what the risk was and what
measures were necessary when it introduced the bill.287 Once it had
derogated, the executive could evade the courts’ view of what Article 5
required by relying on courts’ willingness to defer to the executive’s
belief that enough of an emergency existed for it to derogate.288
The Supreme Court’s Declaration of Incompatibility against the
Anti-Terrorism Act clearly had a strong impact on the executive. In
response, the executive created the Prevention of Terrorism Act, which
essentially replaced the indefinite detention in Part IV of Anti-Terrorism
Act with control orders. The new legislation was put in place very
quickly – approximately three months after the Supreme Court’s decision
in A and Others. Further, the Home Secretary explicitly stated that the
purpose of the Prevention of Terrorism Bill was to ensure that the law
was made compliant with A and Others.289 The executive also indicated
that, after A and Others, it had behind-the-scenes discussions with the
Supreme Court to make sure that the Prevention of Terrorism Act was
compatible with the Human Rights Act.290
It is possible that the executive was willing to accept the
Declaration of Incompatibility in A and Others so readily, effectively
treating it like a statutory strike-down, because it was afraid of a similar
ruling with regard to the renewal orders, which were secondary
legislation and therefore could actually be struck down by the judiciary.
If that happened, the prisoners would have to be released, so the
executive was willing to amend the Anti-Terrorism Act with the
Prevention of Terrorism Act’s control orders. These control orders
would keep the prisoners under some control and would be primary
legislation that could not be struck down.
The impact of the European Court of Human Rights case law is also
apparent. After A and Others was decided, the executive stated that it
was creating new legislation because it feared a similar ruling by the
287. 375 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2001) 127 (U.K.) [Beverly Hughes, MP]. The
Opposition’s antipathy for the European Court of Human Rights’ ruling regarding Article
3 in Chahal was manifest throughout the Bill’s passage through Parliament. See 375
PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2001) 49, 133 (U.K.) [Oliver Letwin, MP; James Paice, MP].
288. The British judiciary could be expected to defer under the doctrine of
parliamentary sovereignty and the European Court of Human Rights could be expected to
defer under the doctrine of the margin of appreciation.
289. 431 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2005) 345-47 (U.K.) [Charles Clarke].
290. Id. at 346.
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European Court of Human Rights.291 The Supreme Court also felt the
European Court of Human Rights’ influence. The fact that the European
Court of Human Rights has historically deferred to Member States’
decision to derogate due to a national emergency probably strongly
influenced the Supreme Court’s decision to defer to the executive’s
emergency designation.292 The British Supreme Court’s deference is not
surprising; British courts are required to “take into account” European
Court of Human Rights case law when interpreting the European
Convention on Human Rights.293 The Supreme Court also repeatedly
referred to the European Court of Human Rights’ decisions and reports
in A and Others.294
After the Prevention of Terrorism Act was passed, the executive
continued to behave strategically with regard to the Supreme Court’s
rulings. The executive was willing to be creative with judicial decisions
and read them in a way that was most beneficial to the executive and its
agenda. All three of the Supreme Court’s decisions in October 2007
found some European Convention on Human Rights violation, which
should arguably have led the executive to re-examine the control orders
for European Convention on Human Rights compliance. Instead, the
executive interpreted each of these decisions to mean that either the law
did not need changing or that the Supreme Court had already made the
appropriate changes and so no executive action was required. For
example, instead of accepting the British Supreme Court’s holding in JJ
that the control orders violated right to liberty under Article 5, the
executive took a stray remark from Lord Brown’s opinion to argue that it
needed only to slightly reduce the curfew hours in order to comply with
the European Convention on Human Rights.295
The executive’s willingness to rely on the judiciary to fix its human
rights infractions is also apparent here. The executive accepted the
Supreme Court “reading in” terms to the Prevention of Terrorism Act’s
control order procedures to make sure they did not violate the right to a
291. Id.
292. Tom R. Hickman, Between Human Rights and the Rule of Law: Indefinite
Detention and the Derogation Model of Constitutionalism, 68 MOD. L. REV. 655, 667
(2005).
293. Human Rights Act, 1998, § 2 (U.K.).
294. A v. Sec’y of State for Home Dep’t, [2004] UKHL 56, [34], [43] (Lord
Bingham) (noting the concerns of the European Commissioner for Human Rights in his
Opinion 1/2002 (28 August 2002)).
295. JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 235, at [55-73].
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fair hearing. Moreover, the executive used that “reading in” to avoid any
responsibility for changing the legislation itself, even though there was
an opportunity to do so with the Counter-Terrorism Bill. Likewise, the
executive took E’s holding that the Secretary of State should monitor
control orders as a simple clarification of the Secretary of State’s duties.
With that clarification in hand, the executive saw no need to address the
matter again, despite the Joint Committee on Human Rights’
protestations.296
15. Influence of Parliament and the Joint Committee on Human
Rights
Throughout the various stages of the three antiterrorism laws,
Parliament and the Joint Committee on Human Rights had a role to play
and the Joint Committee’s influence seems to have grown over time.
Every iteration of British anti-terrorism legislation was amended due to
resistance by Parliament (particularly the Lords) and the Joint Committee
on Human Rights. On the other hand, the executive felt free to disagree
with Parliament and the Joint Committee on Human Rights regarding
most of the human rights implications of the Anti-Terrorism Act. Even
support by the media did not give the legislature enough power to change
the executive’s mind on key provisions of its anti-terrorism legislation.
Parliament, therefore, had limited power over the executive with regard
to the Anti-Terrorism Act.
However, the Joint Committee on Human Rights Reports’ criticisms
of the Anti-Terrorism Act were borne out by the Supreme Court’s
decision in A and Others, which arguably gave its later reports more
weight within Parliament and for the executive. Indeed, the Joint
Committee on Human Rights typically couches its reports in terms of
how courts will likely view legislation297 so the Supreme Court’s prior
disapproval gave the Joint Committee on Human Rights much more
ammunition with which to attack future anti-terrorism legislation. On
the other hand, Parliament’s role in passing the Anti-Terrorism Act did

296. JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 248; JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, supra note 235, at [40]; JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 227, at [514]; JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 257, at [12-17, 21-62].
297. David Feldman, Injecting Law into Politics and Politics into Law: Legislative
and Judicial Perspectives on Constitutional Human Rights, 34 COMMON L. WORLD REV.
104, 115 (2005).
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influence the judiciary to adopt a more deferential position to the
Government’s emergency designation and the reports of the various
parliamentary committees also influenced the findings of the Supreme
Court.298
The Counter-Terrorism Bill showed the resurgence of Parliament’s
power in the legislative process. Although the Joint Committee on
Human Rights did not make progress with its proposed amendments, the
House of Lords (and very nearly the Commons) was able to effectively
prevent the executive from instituting the forty-two days detention
policy. The Joint Committee on Human Rights’ other proposed
amendments did not pass but, for at least a few of them, the executive
promised to look at the issue. 299
This promise was fulfilled after the Liberal-democrats were made
part of the executive through their coalition with the Conservatives.
Control orders have been reduced to TPIMs, which give more freedom to
suspected terrorists,300 because of the election promises made by the
Liberal-democrats in response to Joint Committee on Human Rights
reports, judicial decisions and media outrage.301 Accordingly, it was the
Joint Committee on Human Rights, Parliament, the British Supreme
Court, and the European Court of Human Rights working together that
was the most successful in convincing the executive to alter its antiterrorism legislation.
This story is ongoing, particularly with regard to the power
struggles over the renewal of control orders and the creation of the
Conservative-Liberal-democrat coalition. It can be expected that future
bills will give further insight into how the three branches of the British
government interact to create anti-terrorism law.
III.

Conclusion

The United States and United Kingdom began with similar antiterrorism legislation that allowed for their executive branches to
298. A v. Sec’y of State for Home Dep’t, [2004] UKHL 56, [25, 29, 34, 115-16]
(Lord Bingham).
299. JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 268, at App’x 3.
300. HOME OFFICE, supra note 281, at 10, 11, 17, 20, 31, 35, 41, 43, 45.
301. Allegra Stratton & Patrick Wintour, Front: Clegg Goes to War with Labour
Over Civil Liberties, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Apr. 14, 2010, at 1, available at 2010 WLNR
7634011.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/6

48

1238

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:3

indefinitely detain suspected terrorists, particularly those who could not
be deported. The initial anti-terrorism laws in both countries were
heavily impacted by the same event – the attacks of September 11, 2001
– and the executives in both countries used the media to influence the
legislatures to pass sweeping anti-terrorism legislation that expanded the
executive’s powers. Yet, the executive branches in both countries were
met with resistance by the legislature, which forced them to amend the
anti-terrorism legislation before it would pass. Moreover, the laws in
both countries were affected by the judiciary; before the fact in the
United States and after enactment in the United Kingdom.
The major difference between both countries is how many conflicts
the British government experienced before reaching a stable antiterrorism law regime. Several anti-terrorism bills were passed in the
United Kingdom, each one lessening the executive’s control over
detainees, and each one was still criticized by the legislature and
judiciary.
However, because the British executive still controls
Parliament and, therefore, the judiciary, it took a political shift and a
change to the members of the executive branch and Parliament (through
the election of the Coalition Government) before the executive was
willing to make any major changes to existing anti-terrorism laws. On
the other hand, it was the strong party affiliation in the United Kingdom,
which removed much of the legislative gridlock that plagues Congress,
that allowed these substantial policy changes to occur. Once the
executive comes in to power, it can pass its legislation virtually
unfettered. The House of Commons generally follows its party and the
Lords, although capable of delaying legislation, cannot block it.
The United Kingdom’s less balanced system meant that the
executive was originally able to pass anti-terrorism legislation that was
much stricter than that in the United States, despite the existence of the
European Convention on Human Rights. However, it also meant that
this legislation was easily undone when a new executive came into
power. As a result, in the United Kingdom, although restricted in their
movements, unremovable aliens suspected of terrorism have been given
much greater freedom than their American counterparts. The United
Kingdom’s anti-terrorism legislation therefore shows the effects of
executive dominance on the creation of law.
The United States represents a much more balanced and stable
system; the original PATRIOT Act was never superseded by future
legislation. On the other hand, when drafting the PATRIOT Act, the
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executive anticipated the judiciary’s preference for reviews of detentions
every six months and incorporated that provision into the PATRIOT Act
without any request from the judiciary to do so. The American Supreme
Court has been able to make some changes to anti-terrorism legislation
but it is limited to the cases and issues brought before it and it is also
limited by the political affiliations of the judges, which can lead to its
own kind of gridlock. In contrast, the change in the political affiliation of
the executive has not had a very strong impact; Guantanamo remains
open and indefinite detention remains a reality. In terms of progress for
detainees, therefore, the United State might learn from the United
Kingdom and its willingness to amend legislation in response to political
and popular pressure.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/6

50

